作者:
Douglass C. North
/
Robert Paul Thomas 出版社: Cambridge University Press 副标题: A New Economic History 出版年: 1976-7-30 页数: 180 定价: USD 32.99 装帧: Paperback ISBN: 9780521290999
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to ...
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."
作者简介
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Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic His...
Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic History Association and the Western Economic Association. His major interest is the evolution of economic and political institutions. The effects of institutions on the development of economies through time is a major emphasis in his work in both economic history and development. Among his books are The Rise of the Western World (with R. P. Thomas, 2nd edition), 1973, Growth and Welfare in the American Past, 1973, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1981, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
目录
· · · · · ·
Table of Contents
Preface
Part I. Theory and Overview: 1. The issue
2. The overview
Part II. 900–1500: 3. Property rights in land and man
4. Economic conditions at the end of the Early Middle Ages
· · · · · ·
(更多)
Table of Contents
Preface
Part I. Theory and Overview: 1. The issue
2. The overview
Part II. 900–1500: 3. Property rights in land and man
4. Economic conditions at the end of the Early Middle Ages
5. The High Middle Ages: a fronier movement
6. Thirteenth-century Europe
7. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
Part III. 1500–1700: 8. Fiscal policy and property rights
9. The Early Modern period
10. France and Spain - the also-rans
11. The Netherlands and successful economic growth
12. England
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index.
· · · · · · (收起)
中文翻译看起来有些难受，缺乏相关欧洲历史背景的我读起来更为吃力……但确实感到，本书以详实的数据和非常丰富的史实，论述了它的观点——经济增长的根本原因是实现有效的（即marginal social benefit=marginal private benefit的）经济制度。希望有一天自己的英文水平可以允许我去看英文原版吧。
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0 有用 Abi 2017-05-25 14:41:34
这家伙喜欢跑题。对每个国家和时期论述时的重点与史料都使用不均，叙述中也不易分清这是历史现象还是ideally根据经济模型应该有的样子。很重要的土地私有化可流转的史实基本只给了十三世纪英国的。对于最重要的论点：交易成本的降低，在荷兰只讲到其然，未见最重要的所以然（为什么在法国和西班牙就实现不了）。同样解释了西班牙却解释不了更复杂的北意大利。总体的论点是很整齐的。
0 有用 杏仁 2021-04-28 22:54:07
新制度史学方法论。可移植性存一点保留态度。久远数据和史料的吃力无法避免，讨论思路，“分析”本身和角度可以借鉴。基于剑桥史写的。
1 有用 一朵小野菊 2011-12-19 15:26:39
人口本身不是问题，制度才是关键。。但制度也要看社会进步的程度。。
0 有用 安德烈 2019-11-15 19:50:51
Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
0 有用 huhu 2011-06-30 11:02:42
经济增长来源于自由的市场，和恰当的法制。政府都有短视的倾向，必须限制政府权力。
0 有用 柏拉图下港口 2023-03-22 22:37:57 北京
诺思的前提是一个完全市场能够确保经济活动的私人回报与社会回报的等同，在此情况下，私人的利益最大化行为就等于社会的利益最大化行为，其预设是只有私人才能真正做出扩大规模、发明创新、人力资本投资等有利于社会生产的行为。但是，进一步的推论是，现实中私人与社会的成本与回报并不等同，存在交易成本与外部性，制度安排的重要目的就是确定和保护产权、消除市场不完全性，促使两者等同，而制度同样作为有正外部性的产品，需要... 诺思的前提是一个完全市场能够确保经济活动的私人回报与社会回报的等同，在此情况下，私人的利益最大化行为就等于社会的利益最大化行为，其预设是只有私人才能真正做出扩大规模、发明创新、人力资本投资等有利于社会生产的行为。但是，进一步的推论是，现实中私人与社会的成本与回报并不等同，存在交易成本与外部性，制度安排的重要目的就是确定和保护产权、消除市场不完全性，促使两者等同，而制度同样作为有正外部性的产品，需要政府出马进行制度建设，因为政府若能从经济繁荣中获得税收收益，它就相当于把制度的正外部性内部化了。这里，政府也做出了有利于社会生产的行为，诺思无意间违背了只有私人才能进行这种活动的预设，这点是他在后来的作品中不断尝试进行修正的“国家理论”部分。 (展开)
0 有用 你的阿仙奴 2022-04-08 10:23:03
Institutional malfeasance during the Middle Age epidemic reads shockingly true today ... sad
0 有用 文糸 2022-01-26 21:45:51
中文翻译看起来有些难受，缺乏相关欧洲历史背景的我读起来更为吃力……但确实感到，本书以详实的数据和非常丰富的史实，论述了它的观点——经济增长的根本原因是实现有效的（即marginal social benefit=marginal private benefit的）经济制度。希望有一天自己的英文水平可以允许我去看英文原版吧。
0 有用 杏仁 2021-04-28 22:54:07
新制度史学方法论。可移植性存一点保留态度。久远数据和史料的吃力无法避免，讨论思路，“分析”本身和角度可以借鉴。基于剑桥史写的。
0 有用 Dean Zhao 2020-04-23 22:26:32
无需多说，大师级作品。历史叙述在一些地方还是比较entangled，但总体上来还是给人耳目一新的感觉。简明晚期中世纪与近代早期西方经济史，总体的大背景是中世纪晚期人口增长、土地拓垦导致的庄园经济向商品-货币-市场经济的转型，强调经济组织、强制机关与产权制度在促进私营部门开采市场资源上的关键作用，并形成了西方持续性的经济增长。虽然强调制度在促进经济增长时的作用，但整个的叙事还是建立在市场经济的基础上... 无需多说，大师级作品。历史叙述在一些地方还是比较entangled，但总体上来还是给人耳目一新的感觉。简明晚期中世纪与近代早期西方经济史，总体的大背景是中世纪晚期人口增长、土地拓垦导致的庄园经济向商品-货币-市场经济的转型，强调经济组织、强制机关与产权制度在促进私营部门开采市场资源上的关键作用，并形成了西方持续性的经济增长。虽然强调制度在促进经济增长时的作用，但整个的叙事还是建立在市场经济的基础上的。说白了，经济要增长，必须有市场。 (展开)