A “mind,” like any other individual object, is necessarily an instance of a material regional category. My own mind is the only mind that is given to me originally and presentationally. I may, however, consider my evidently existent mind merely qua possible instance of the regional category “mind in general,” and, through free variation of its factual determinations, clarify the necessary structure of that category. I may then distinguish and clarify certain necessary determinations of minds as purely possible instances of certain special eidetic material determinations within the regional category. (查看原文)
Could there be two worlds, two infinite systems of monads with no world in common? It is obvious that this is impossible. There might be two groups of monads which had no factual social relationships, but the monads or social group to which my monad did not belong are nevertheless intentional correlates of a constitutive system within my monad, and my monad has for me the sense of an intentional correlate of constitutive systems in them. There can be, accordingly, but one system of transcendental existent monads, and correlatively but one intersubjective natural world. This natural world must in turn exist as phenomenon if the compossibility of other monads is implied by the intrinsic structure of my monad. And this, we have seen, is the case.
On the other hand, it is evident that, as Le... (查看原文)
Phaenomenologica(共370册)，
这套丛书还有
《Collected Papers, Vol. 3》《How is Society Possible?: Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems of the Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz》《Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence》《Materials Characterization for Systems Performance and Reliability》《On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism》
等
。
还没人写过短评呢
还没人写过短评呢