Having declared that difference between nations classes, and ideologies will not be the primary source of conflict, he is unable to connect the rise of radical Islamism, for example, with the collapse of world oil prices, Western support for corrupt local regimes, the failure of secular elites to extend the benefits of modernization to local workers and peasants, massive unemployment among Arab youth, the persistence of internal ethnic and class divisions, the collapse of socialist alternatives, and so forth. Nor can he explain why so many middle-class Indians now see Hindu revivalism as a solution to their problems, or what drives many contemporary Russians to endorse through popular vote the neo-fascist policies of Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
By specifying the commonalities hinted at by Huntington, the paradigm of basic human needs challenges realist assumptions at their source. Conflict specialists John Burton, Paul Sites, and others argue that serious social conflict is not generated by individual aggressiveness or international lawlessness as much as by the failure of existing systems to satisfy people!ˉs basic needsCertain needs (e.g., identity, bonding, security, meaning, and development) are shared by all human beings. Unlike interests, they are not bargainable; people will not trade their identities or belief-systems for money or surrender them even at gunpoint. And unlike values, they are not specific to particular cultures or civilizations. Local cultures, or the state of a society!ˉs development, define the satisfiers of basic needs, but the needs themselves ar
universal. Moreover, they are irrepressible, demanding satisfaction no matter how a society!ˉs leader may seek to suppress or manipulate them. If adherence to a street gang, a nation, or a civilization is a way of attempting to satisfy unfulfilled needs for identity, bonding, and security, neither coercion nor persuasion will alter that behavior. On the other hand, the conflicts generated by unsatisfied needs can be resolved (not just managed) by altering existing social and political arrangements to the extent necessary o satisfy them. The problem, ordinarily, is not a shortage of satisfiers; it is the unwillingness of elites to make the necessary system changes.
In that light, what are the circumstances that could generate pan-national or civilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War era? In modern times, at least, culture is unlikely to function as a political rallying-point unless at least three conditions are met:
First, the participants must feel that their identities, liberties, and livelihoods are seriously and immediately threatened by powerful, culturally distinguishable outsiders, often supported by local allies!aan !°ene within.!± The degree of perceived threat is far more salient, in that regard, than the degree of perceive cultural difference.
Second, participants!ˉ other methods of satisfying their basic needs for identity, development, meaning and security must be discredited or currently unavailable. The merger of one!ˉs class or nation with other in some pannational entity is unlikely to occur unless class- and ethnic-based organizations have already proven ineffectual.
Third, some regional hegemon must be capable of persuading or forcing weaker nations to accept its !°representation!± of their cultural and political interests. Even Huntington would probably find it hard conceive of a Slavic-Orthodox civilization without Russia, a Hindu civilization without India, or a Confucian civilization without China. In fact, where no contender for hegemony exists, as in the case of the Buddhist nations, Huntington does not count the civilization as a !°player!± at a
Pan-nationalist militancy, in other words, is not a spontaneous growth but a response to political
subordination, cultural humiliation, and blocked economic development. The case of Germany illustrates that process. It took Napoleon!ˉs conquests to provoke the construction of a Germanic political identity and Prussian hegemony to give that identity institutional expression. It took British and French imperialism to convince Germans that, as the German nationalist Ernst Hasse wrote in his work Deutsche Politik , they !°had the same right to expand as other great peoples, and that if not granted this possibilit overseas, [they would] be forced to do it in Europe.!± And it took a combination of the Versailles system the Great Depression, and the collapse of liberal and socialist alternatives to convert pan-German nationalism into Nazi racial supremacy. By the same token, if the Islamic-Confucian alliance so feared by Huntington should materialize to challenge Western power, or if Slavic-Orthodox peoples should reunite around a hegemonic Russia, cultural values and the !°will to power!± will have far less to do with su developments than with the inability of Western-dominated peoples to satisfy their basic needs for identity, security, and development.
Why, indeed, unless basic human needs are unfulfilled, should those who participate in different cultures fight? While human history surely provides examples of violent cultural and civilizational conflict, more prevalent still are stories of culture-groups avoiding, tolerating, or accommodating each other; merging with other groups to form new entities; or absorbing or being absorbed by others. In fact, from the perspective of conflict resolution, Huntington has got things exactly backwards. Struggles between social classes and between different levels of the power-knowledge hierarchy can be very difficult to resolve.Conflicts based primarily on cultural differences alone are easier to settle. That is because the parties to intercultural conflicts generally seek goods such as identity and mutual recognition, which are not in short supply, and because the clash of cultural values or world-views is not nearly as absolute as Huntington
implies. Hindus and Muslims in India do not generally make war on each other simply because one group loves cows and the other eats them. One can imagine any number of sociopolitical systems that would permit cow-lovers and cow-eaters, those who worship in temples and those who worship in mosques, to recognize each other!ˉs identities and interact without massacring each other. The principal obstacles t Hindu-Muslim peace in India are not incompatible cultural values but social and political conditions that allow each group to believe that it can survive only at another!ˉs expense. Without altering the condition that make it impossible to satisfy basic human needs, conflicts like that one cannot be resolved.
Huntington!ˉs pessimism with regard to resolving civilizational conflict is evidently based not only on his cultural relativism, but on the silent assumption that, in the brave new post-Cold War world, this sort of system-change is impossible.
We disagree. In response to Huntington!ˉs dark vision of civilizational struggle, we answer: Destructiv conflict between identity groups, including pan-nationalist or civilizational groupings, can be averted and can be resolved if they do occur. But a violent clash of civilizations could well result from our continuing failure to transform the systems of inequality that make social life around the globe a struggle for individual and group survival! A systems that feed the illusion that either one civilization or another must be dominant
Pan-national movements remain, as they have been in the past, misguided responses to foreign
domination and native misgovernment. In our view, Huntington!ˉs call for the global defense of Wester interests against competing civilizations therefore represents the worst sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Nevertheless, his rhetorical question, !°If not civilizations, what?!± deserves an answer. Satisfying bas human needs on a global basis will require a powerful movement for social change!aa movement waitin to be born.
Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China (!°a civilization pretending to be state,!± as Lucian Pye put it)
Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall, they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.
Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that,however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History , Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.
These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.
First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.
Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different
civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.
Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from long-standing local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled !°fundamentalist.!± Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduis as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The !°unsecularization of the world,!± George Weigel has remarked, !°is one of the dominant social facts of l in the late twentieth century.!± The revival of religion, !la revanche de Dieu,!± as Gilles Kepel labeled it
provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.
Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and !°Asianization!± in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and t!°Hinduization!± of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hen!°re-Islamization!± of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization Boris Yeltsin!ˉs country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.
In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.
Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was !°Which sid are you on?!± and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations the question is !°What are you?!± That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.
Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rosebetween 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and
举例：拿中国、香港、台湾、新加坡和海外华人举例。（这几个地方的华人不仅仅是一个文化圈，好多人上溯三代真的是一家人。用家族观念如此深重，又刚好在百年前发生大迁徙的中国人举例真的好吗… … 华人家族真是东亚经济的脊梁骨啊）
Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People!ˉs Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chines communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed, From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network!aoften based on extensions of the traditional clans!ahas been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.
The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West!ˉs military presence I the Persian Gulf, the West!ˉs overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape thei own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.
Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab
countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.
On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilization. The West!ˉ!°next confrontation,!± observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, !°is definitely going to come fthe Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.!± Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion
We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the
governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations!athe perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.
As with any paradigm, there is much the civilization paradigm does not account for, and critics will have no trouble citing events that it does not explain and would not have predicted. However, the debates the civilizational paradigm has generated around the world show that, in some measure, it strikes home.
Wherever one turns, the world is at odds with itself. Thus, at issue is what could be responsible for these conflicts if it is not the differences in civilizations themselves. In the end, faith and family, blood and belief are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. That is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics and why a civilization paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes.
!°To be accepted as a paradigm,!± Kuhn wrote, theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.
Culture Is To Die For
Wherever one turns, the world is at odds with itself. If differences in civilization are not responsible for these conflicts, what is? The critics of the civilization paradigm have not produced a better explanation for what is going on in the world. The civilizational paradigm, in contrast, strikes a responsive chord throughout the world. In Asia, as one U.S. ambassador reported, it is !°spreading like wildfire.!±
Europe, European Community President Jacques Delors explicitly endorsed its argument that !°futur conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology!± and warned, !°The We needs to develop a deeper understanding of the religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations, and the way other nations see their interests, to identify what we have in common.!± Muslims in turn, have seen !°the clash!± as providing recognition and, in some degree, legitimation for tdistinctiveness of their own civilization and its independence from the West. That civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way in which people see and experience reality.
History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilizations unite and divide humankind. The forces making for clashes between civilizations can be contained only if they are recognized. In a !°world o different civilizations,!± as my article concluded, each !°will have to learn to coexist with the others.!± Wultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. And that is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics, and why a civilizational paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in the world.
这篇论述媒体该怎样运用亨廷顿理论的文章简直就是亨廷顿理论是unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy 的铁证啊。
The News Media and the !°Clash of Civilizations
Philip Seib. Parameters .
Abstract (Document Summary)
Seib uses Samuel Huntington!ˉs thesis regarding the clash of civilizations to analyze how the news media might better shape its coverage of world events. He sees the clash theory as a means for focusing media resources following the Cold War era. The ability to have a geographic region and a bad guy will permit the media to be more efficient [in] their application of resources.