自由的忠诚 8.8分
读书笔记 平等自由与国家
小刘

“平等自由(Equal freedom)与国家”是第一部分的标题。在这一部分,作者所要解决的问题是:如何从自由主义的角度为特殊性假定辩护(The Particularity Assumption)。所谓特殊性假定,指的是:

a special bond or obligation that ties the citizen or resident to her state, and to her compatriots, and not to others, and requires her to support these people and these institutions and not others.(P6* 原书页码,下同)

这一观点受到了普世主义者的挑战,他们认为,我们所拥有的自由平等权利,不会国别、种族、区域而受限;国家的界限并不构成对正义的限制。我们生为哪国哪族人,仅仅是一个原始事实(brute fact),并不具备任何道德意义,因此,强调对特定群体的特殊义务就意味着在人与人之间任意做出区别。自由主义的民族主义者虽然提出了辩护,但是这种辩护在作者看来并不是一个真正的自由主义辩护。作者指出:

On the one hand, they could concede (with the cosmopolitans) that the moral principles on which liberalism is based should apply globally to all individuals, without reference to their geographical location, and therefore that special obligations to our own states and compatriots are in fact morally unjustifiable. This would save the liberal claim to moral universalism, but at the expense of adopting the cosmopolitan position. On the other hand, traditional liberals could admit that democratic institutions tacitly presuppose a cultural nation, which provides the real demarcating criterion for who may and who may not belong, and defines the group of persons to whom we have political obligations. This would save the particularity assumption, but at the expense of betraying liberal universalist background principles.(P19)

而她所要做的,就是基于康德和卢梭的理论,为特殊性假定做出辩护。辩护主要分为两个部分,一是权威(Authority),来回应无政府主义者/普遍主义者的挑战;二是民主,即用卢梭的观点来解决康德的国家理论所不能弥补的问题。

【1】Authority

这一部分内容的线索是是由对西蒙斯(Simmons)的批判而展开的。基于一种洛克式的权利观点,西蒙斯指出,就个人财产的确认来说,个人没必要非得进入国家;国家就如同一个保险公司,它固然能够很好地维护你的利益,但这并不意味着你就一定要接受这笔保险。

Because he thinks that human beings would be equally free without the state, simply by acting on their duties of interpersonal morality, Simmons believes there is only one morally acceptable way in which such states might come to have the rights to direct and coerce them characteristic of political authority: namely, through the voluntary consent of these individuals
.……
Simmons rejects any appeal to the brute fact of our membership in certain institutional schemes as a justification for our having obligations to those schemes. “Since being born into a political community is neither an act we perform, nor the result of a decision we have made,” argues Simmons, “we feel that this should not limit our freedom by automatically binding us to the government of that community.”(P30)

如此一来,我们自然也就没有必要承担对国家的义务。

但作者认为,保险公司的比喻是不恰当的。她所要确立的观点是:

equal freedom cannot be defined or made determinate without state authority, and therefore that justice, when rightly understood, must commit us to accepting the authority of legitimate states.(P28)

而作者的给出的论述大致概括如下:

1) 基本预设:equal freedom synonymously with justice:

2) 基本区分:康德和西蒙斯都认可独立自由(freedom as independence);

To be free-as-independent, as all these thinkers conceive it, is not to be forced to obey the will of another person; it is to enjoy a sphere of independent self-government within which others cannot interfere. This notion of freedom is thus particularly concerned with the relationships between persons.(P37)

康德进而区分了两种自由,内在的形而上的自由(internal or metaphysical freedom)和外在自由(external freedom defined by the individual’s capacity to set and pursue ends in the outside world, by acting)。在此基础之上,康德又分出两种不同的权利,与生俱来的内在权利和必须获得的外在权利(rights that belong to us innately and those we must acquire)。有三种既得权利(acquired rights),而三种权利都是由国家确保的。

3)私人之间所确立的财产权利必然会损害独立自由;权利的确定必须是客观的,不能基于主观解读。在自然状态下,私人权利的确立离不开个人对权利的解读—>个人的单方解读意味着,在双方有冲突时,一个人必须要服从于另一个人的权威—>服从的结果:损害每个个体作为主体平等自由个人的独立性/不服从的结果:靠武力化解—>因此,权利必须诉诸公法裁决。

4)我们在道德上有必要进入国家。

Since our natural duties to others already require us to respect their freedom as independence, and since, because of the problems of unilateral private interpretation and enforcement, the state is necessary for that purpose, we have a natural duty to enter the state.(54)

5) 更进一步,Justice is a necessarily institutional value.

Justice, as we have seen, could not possibly be secured by our private actions, even if we act in good faith and try to carry out our moral duties. This is because no matter how benevolent and well disposed human beings are, the structure of an extra-institutional situation always gives other persons a form of coercive private control over us that is in contradiction to freedom, since others retain the power to interfere with our choices unilaterally and at will.(P56)

【2】Democracy

然而,如果我们认可了国家在道德上的重要性,接受了它作为我们的政治权威,那么我们希望这个权威能够保障我们基本的自由权利不受损害;如果这个国家不是一个自由民主的国家,根本无从保障我们的自由与平等,我们为何要负有对其忠诚的义务呢?作者认为,康德的理论并没有解决好这个问题,但这一问题可以诉诸卢梭的社会契约论。

也就是说,如果我们要接受一个政治权威,那么就一定接受一个能够保障自由平等的权威——这个权威能够为自由划出界限但并不支配我们,不会剥夺我们的自由人格;卢梭的公意就是这样一种权威。接下来,作者通过对公意、公共利益、交出自由权利等社会契约论中的经典问题的论述,来阐述我们如何能够寻找到一个合法的政治权威。实际上,对于这一点,可以直接跳回到卢梭在《社会契约论》中的论述上去:为什么公共意志永远正确。

【3】Political Obligation and Justice

在这一章中,作者先重申了前两章的观点,紧接着进入一个具体问题的讨论。如果我们按照卢梭的观点,只接受一个合法权威,那么在现实中,我们如何判断这个政治权威是否合法呢?

首先,无论是Raz或是Hobbes都提到了一个观点,即使政治权威在某些方面出现了错误,也不影响到它继续发挥作用——除非,它已经破坏了最低限度。

If it requires anything, it must require at least these minimal guarantees.(P91)

那么这些最低标准包括那些呢?

I think it is best to see bodily inviolability; property; freedom of conscience, movement, and expression; equal treatment before the law; and subsistence as minimal “Kantian” criteria for the guarantee of our equal right to freedom as independence. No state that does not meet at least these conditions is reasonably interpretable as a freedom-guaranteeing state, simply because its laws do not guarantee even the “core” content of equal freedom.(P93)
……
Rousseau goes beyond Kant, however, in adding a set of procedural requirements on legitimacy: he says that any just state must be a democratic state, since only a democratic state can impose laws in a nondominating way, and without subjecting us to the private will of another. …Citizens in general must be disposed to manifest a concern with the freedom and well-being of all their compatriots, and not simply with a partial subset of the citizenry, if the laws they produce are to be legitimate.(P94)

——

关于全球正义的部分,略。

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