自由的忠诚 8.8分
读书笔记 平等自由与国家

“平等自由(Equal freedom)与国家”是第一部分的标题。在这一部分,作者所要解决的问题是:如何从自由主义的角度为特殊性假定辩护(The Particularity Assumption)。所谓特殊性假定,指的是:

a special bond or obligation that ties the citizen or resident to her state, and to her compatriots, and not to others, and requires her to support these people and these institutions and not others.(P6* 原书页码,下同)

这一观点受到了普世主义者的挑战,他们认为,我们所拥有的自由平等权利,不会国别、种族、区域而受限;国家的界限并不构成对正义的限制。我们生为哪国哪族人,仅仅是一个原始事实(brute fact),并不具备任何道德意义,因此,强调对特定群体的特殊义务就意味着在人与人之间任意做出区别。自由主义的民族主义者虽然提出了辩护,但是这种辩护在作者看来并不是一个真正的自由主义辩护。作者指出:

On the one hand, they could concede (with the cosmopolitans) that the moral principles on which liberalism is based should apply globally to all individuals, without reference to their geographical location, and therefore that special obligations to our own states and compatriots are in fact morally unjustifiable. This would save the liberal claim to moral universalism, but at the expense of adopting the cosmopolitan position. On the other hand, traditional liberals could admit that democratic institutions tacitly presuppose a cultural nation, which provides the real demarcating criterion for who may and who may not belong, and defines the group of persons to whom we have political obligations. This would save the particularity assumption, but at the expense of betraying liberal universalist background principles.(P19)




Because he thinks that human beings would be equally free without the state, simply by acting on their duties of interpersonal morality, Simmons believes there is only one morally acceptable way in which such states might come to have the rights to direct and coerce them characteristic of political authority: namely, through the voluntary consent of these individuals
Simmons rejects any appeal to the brute fact of our membership in certain institutional schemes as a justification for our having obligations to those schemes. “Since being born into a political community is neither an act we perform, nor the result of a decision we have made,” argues Simmons, “we feel that this should not limit our freedom by automatically binding us to the government of that community.”(P30)



equal freedom cannot be defined or made determinate without state authority, and therefore that justice, when rightly understood, must commit us to accepting the authority of legitimate states.(P28)


1) 基本预设:equal freedom synonymously with justice:

2) 基本区分:康德和西蒙斯都认可独立自由(freedom as independence);

To be free-as-independent, as all these thinkers conceive it, is not to be forced to obey the will of another person; it is to enjoy a sphere of independent self-government within which others cannot interfere. This notion of freedom is thus particularly concerned with the relationships between persons.(P37)

康德进而区分了两种自由,内在的形而上的自由(internal or metaphysical freedom)和外在自由(external freedom defined by the individual’s capacity to set and pursue ends in the outside world, by acting)。在此基础之上,康德又分出两种不同的权利,与生俱来的内在权利和必须获得的外在权利(rights that belong to us innately and those we must acquire)。有三种既得权利(acquired rights),而三种权利都是由国家确保的。



Since our natural duties to others already require us to respect their freedom as independence, and since, because of the problems of unilateral private interpretation and enforcement, the state is necessary for that purpose, we have a natural duty to enter the state.(54)

5) 更进一步,Justice is a necessarily institutional value.

Justice, as we have seen, could not possibly be secured by our private actions, even if we act in good faith and try to carry out our moral duties. This is because no matter how benevolent and well disposed human beings are, the structure of an extra-institutional situation always gives other persons a form of coercive private control over us that is in contradiction to freedom, since others retain the power to interfere with our choices unilaterally and at will.(P56)




【3】Political Obligation and Justice



If it requires anything, it must require at least these minimal guarantees.(P91)


I think it is best to see bodily inviolability; property; freedom of conscience, movement, and expression; equal treatment before the law; and subsistence as minimal “Kantian” criteria for the guarantee of our equal right to freedom as independence. No state that does not meet at least these conditions is reasonably interpretable as a freedom-guaranteeing state, simply because its laws do not guarantee even the “core” content of equal freedom.(P93)
Rousseau goes beyond Kant, however, in adding a set of procedural requirements on legitimacy: he says that any just state must be a democratic state, since only a democratic state can impose laws in a nondominating way, and without subjecting us to the private will of another. …Citizens in general must be disposed to manifest a concern with the freedom and well-being of all their compatriots, and not simply with a partial subset of the citizenry, if the laws they produce are to be legitimate.(P94)



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