True to Our Feelings 评价人数不足
读书笔记 the ethics of emotion(情绪伦理)
Scott
It will be evident to some readers that this concept of emotional integrity is a version of the existentialist concept of authenticity. What this means (in Heidegger and Sartre, for instance) is none too clear, but it certainly has a lot to do with the agreement of our prereflective engagements in life and our larger reflective outlook. But this distinction is, as I have also been indicating, too simplistic, and so, too, authenticity cannot be a simple match between what we feel (our engagements with the world) and what we think of ourselves and our being in the world. Sartre, in particular, gives the character he calls “the Champion of Sincerity” (in Being and Nothingness) a hard time, because (as becomes evident in his novels and journalism as well as his philosophy) he had dim view of what passes for sincerity in his fellow citizens, which was more often a cloak for hypocrisy and bad faith than a virtue. If we think of sincerity as a simple “match,” there is ample reason for suspicion. Thus authenticity is much better conceived of as a dynamic complex of thoughts, emotions, and social interactions (Sartre’s “Being-for-Others”), and better yet as emotional integrity, which does not have the individualistic implications of authenticity and has built into it the idea of social virtue as well as existential individuality. Emotional integrity is essential to the good life, fully embracing our being with others as well as our need to live in accordance with our (and others’) values. Emotional integrity is, contrary to the bent of some existentialists, anything but narcissistic and internally directed. To the contrary, I would suggest that it suggests an ideal of transcending ourselves by allowing us to become the person we most want to be.
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