Signs (Studies Pheno & Existential Philosophy) 评价人数不足
读书笔记 On the Phenomenology of Language
[1] Husserl and the Problem of Language In more recent writings, on the other hand, language appears as an original way of intending certain objects, as thought's body (Formale und transzendentale Logik), or even as the operation through which thoughts that without it would remain private phenomena acquire intersubjective value and, ultimately, ideal existence (Ursprung der Geometrie). (p.84-5) ... From the phenomenological point of view (that is, for the speaking subject who makes use of his language as a means of communicating with a living community), a language regains its unity. It is no longer the result of a chaotic past of independent linguistic facts but a system all of whose elements cooperate in a single attempt to express which is turned toward the present or the future and thus governed by a present logic. (p.85) [2] The Phenomenon of Language 1. Language and Speech Phenomenology would add our inner experience of a language to our linguistic knowledge of it as pedagogy adds to our knowledge of mathematical concepts the experience of what they become in the minds of those who learn them. Our experience of speech would then have nothing to teach us about the being of language; it would have no ontological bearing. [...] we set in motion a dialectic through which the two disciplines open communications. At first the "subjective" point of view envelops the "objective" point of view; synchrony envelops diachrony. The past of language began by being present. The series of fortuitous linguistic facts brought out by the objective perspective has been incorporated in a language which was at every moment a system endowed with an inner logic. Thus if language is a system when it is considered according to a cross-section, it must be in its development too. ... a double task is imposed upon us: a) a meaning in the development of language, and conceive of language as a moving equilibrium. b) ... the present diffuses into the past to the extent that the past has been present. History is the history of successive synchronies, and the contingency of the linguistic past invades even the synchronic system. (p.87) 2. The Quasi-corporeality of the Signifying The words and turns of phrase needed to bring my significative intention to expression recommend themselves to me, when I am speaking, only by what Humboldt called innere Sprachform (and our contemporaries call Wortbegriff), that is, only by a certain style of speaking from which they arise and according to which they are organized without my having to represent them to myself. There is a "languagely" ["langagière"] meaning of language which effects the mediation between my as yet unspeaking intention and words, and in such a way that my spoken words surprise me myself and teach me my thought. (p.88) ... This action at a distance by language, which brings significations together without touching them, and this eloquence which designates them in a peremptory fashion without ever changing them into words or breaking the silence of consciousness, are eminent cases of corporeal intentionality. (p.89) 3. The Relationship of the Signifying and the Signified. Sedimentation My corporeal intending of the objects of my surroundings is implicit and presupposes no thematization or "representation" of my body or milieu. Signification arouses speech as the world arouses my body--by a mute presence which awakens my intentions without deploying itself before them. ... This means three things: (a) The significations of speech are already ideas in the Kantian sense... (b) Let us say that every expression is perfect to the extent it is unequivocally understood, and admit as a fundamental fact of expression a surpassing of the signifying by the signified which it is the very virtue of the signifying to make possible. (p.90) ... (c) this act of expression--this joining through transcendence of the linguistic meaning of speech and the signification it intends--is not for us speaking subjects a second-order operation we supposedly have recourse to only in order to communicate our thoughts to others, but our own taking possession or acquisition of significations which otherwise are present to us only in a muffled way. The reason why the thematization of the signified does not precede speech is that it is the result of it. [...] The significative intention gives itself a body and knows itself by looking for an equivalent in the system of available significations represented by the language I speak and the whole of the writings and culture I inherit. It is just this "coherent deformation" (Malraux) of available significations which arranges them in a new sense and takes not only the hearers but the speaking subjet as well through a decisive step. (p.91) The Nachvollzug, freed from the cautious gropings of the Vollzug, contracts the steps of the process into a single view. Sedimentation occurs, and I shall be able to think farther. Speech, as distinguished from language, is that moment when the significative intention (still silent and wholly in act) proves itself capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of others--of shaping me and others by transforming the meaning of cultural instruments. (p.92) 4. Consequences for Phenomenological Philosophy The description we have given of the signifying power of speech, and in general of the body as mediator of our relation to the object, would provide no philosophical information at all if it could be considered a matter of mere psychological depiction. (p.93) ... an experience has been transformed into its meaning, has become truth. Truth is another name for sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our own. That is to say that even and especially for the ultimate philosophical subject, there is no objectivity which accounts for our super-objective relationship to all times, no light that shines more brightly than the living present's light. In the later text we cited to begin with, Husserl writes that speech realizes a "localization" and "temporalization" of an ideal meaning which, "according to hte meaning of its being," is neither local nor temporal. And later on he adds that speech also objectifies, as concept or proposition, what was heretofore only a formation internal to a single subject, thereby opening it up to the plurality of subjects. So there would seem to be a movement through which ideal existence descends into locality and temporality, and an inverse movement through which the act of speaking here and now establishes the ideality of what is true. (p.96) When I speak or understand, I experience that presence of others in myself or of myself in others which is stumbling-block of the theory of intersubjectivity, I experience that presence of what is represented which is the stumbling-block of the theory of time, and I finally understand what is meant by Husserl's enigmatic statement, "Transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity." To the extent that what I say has meaning, I am a different "other" for myself when I am speaking; and to the extent that I understand, I no longer know who is speaking and who si listening. (p.97)

《Signs (Studies Pheno & Existential Philosophy)》的全部笔记 4篇
免费下载 iOS / Android 版客户端