Life, Death, and Meaning 评价人数不足
读书笔记 Creating People
刘德维希

PART 2 Creating People

要不要来到这个世界上——如果你能读到这些文章,那么这个问题对你的人生来说已经没什么意义了,除非你还想为人父母,并且想做个好人。

1. Whether Causing Someone to Exist Can Benefit This Person by Parfit

Whether causing someone to come into being can benefit? If we believe it can, it can be defensible.不过,需要先指出的是:

We are not claiming that starting to exist can be either good or bad for people when it does not happen. Our claiming is about that starting to exist when it happens.

接下来,我们可以进行如下辩护:1) we need not to claim that it is bad for possible people if they never become actual. 2) if it benefited me to have had my life saved just after it started, I am not forced to deny that it benefited me to have had it started. 3) causing someoen to exist is a special case.

2. Why Not Let Life Become Extinct? by John Leslie

我们可以找出很多理由来说明人类灭绝的好处——但是我们不应该接受这些观点;反之,我们要相信,Lifes are ethically required——当然,这并不意味着你不能当一个丁克,因为谁也不知道未来人的幸福生活该如何裁量。

3.On Becoming Extinct by James Lenman

问题不是人类灭绝了好不好——因为人类迟早灭绝。问题是:人类是早灭绝好,还是晚灭绝好?以我们现有的状况来看,是好是坏都无法证明。

Such intermediate narrative structures, like the structures of family life, lift the moral horizons of the agent beyond her own life in ways that may give that life greater depth. They differ from the total narrative of human history in habing a natural terminus and hence a natural shape. They give no special reason, impersonally speaking, to favor human life ending at any one time rather than another, for the members of any generation will find themselves bound up in some such set of narratives.

养孩子在道德上是可以接受的,只要能够保证他的生活质量居于标准之上——但是标准在哪里,谁也不知道。

4. Why It is Better Never to Come into Existence? by David Benatar

只有少数人的存在确实比从未存在过要好——但是大多数人显然不是。你觉得你的人生值得一过,那也不能证明这就比你从未存在过要好。

It might be said that just as one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in pain, one cannot be mistaken about whether one is glad to have been born. Thus if "I am glad to have been born," a proposition to which many people would seent, is equiavlent to "It is better that I came into existence", then one cannot be mistaken about whether existence is better than non-existence. The problem with this line of reasoning is that these two propositions are not equivalent.

D.B的论证和Parfit的论证在前提上是相似的:你已经存在,与你从未存在,这两者并不是等价的。然而D.B认为,就是因为不等价,所以你从未存在的好处是无法被你有过一个完美人生所能胜过的;而Parfit认为,就是因为不等价,所以这事儿没法比。

由此,D认为人类最好灭绝,孩子最好别生——it is morally unacceptable, although it is morally desirable.

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