这里谈到的视角问题很有趣。莱布尼茨的意思其实可以归纳为，每个有限单子都是从特定的视角出发去理解宇宙的，而无限上帝则同时拥有一切有限视角的总和。莱布尼茨也是反对view from nowhere的，即使是上帝所拥有的也不过是total views from somewhere or anywhere。也是因此，他的无限上帝与有限单子之间的关系并非是此岸与彼岸的对立，而是无限包含了有限。这已经很接近黑格尔的真无限概念了，然而还是有显著差异的。数字上堆砌出来的无穷在黑格尔看来并不是无限。莱布尼茨并不打算遵守亚里士多德的封闭空间宇宙观，而是站在无限宇宙这一边的，所以理论上说，我们是无法穷尽anywhere的，而上帝是视角是anywhere的总和，所以实际上我们根本达不到这个最大值，总是可以通过加1的方式使得原本的最大值破产。这也是Gabriel在Sinnfeldontologie里强调了的。这也是黑格尔与莱布尼茨的差别。
To capture the distinction between the limitedness of the knowledge possessed by finite minds and the infiniteness of God’s knowledge, Leibniz on occasions appealed to the metaphor of “perspective”. Thus, while a finite monad neither exists “in” space nor has extension, it nevertheless represents the universe as if from a point of view “rather as the same town is differently represented according to the different situations of the person who looks at it” (DM: §9). The difference between the apparent spatial “locations” involved here is cashed out in the specific relations among representations contributing to the states of each monad. In contrast, he distinguishes the “view” of God from that of each finite monad in the following way:
God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce in order to manifest his glory. And as he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways—for there is no aspect which escapes his omniscience—the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is, if God finds it good to actualise his thoughts and to produce it, a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (Ibid.: §14)9
Each perspectival finite monad is thus like a “mirror of God” in this regard, this being a familiar Christian Platonist trope found in Eckhart and Cusa to capture the relation of human and divine intellects. The underlying idea of the orderly harmonisation of individual perspectives in the mind of God seems to come from the Herborn Encyclopaedist, Bisterfeld (Antognazza 1999; Rutherford 1995: 36–40); however, the idea is at the heart of Nicholas of Cusa’s Neoplatonic image of “infinite sphere”.10 It is a form in which we shall see the issue return in Kant’s transcendental idealism.