Formal and Transcendental Logic 评价人数不足
读书笔记 §58

156

The possibility of deception is inherent in the evidence of experience and does not annul either its fundamental character or its effect; though becoming evidentially aware of <actual> deception "annuls" the deceptive experience or evidence itself. The evidence of a new experience is what makes the previously uncontested experience undergo that modification of believing called "annulment" or "cancellation"; and it alone can do so. Evidence of experience is therefore always presupposed by the process. The conscious "dispelling" of a deception, with the originality of "now I see that it / is an illusion", is itself a species of evidence, namely evidence of the nullity of something experienced or, correlatively, evidence of the "annulment" of the (previously unmodified) experiential evidence. This too holds for every evidence, for every "experience" in the amplified sense. Even an ostensibly apodictic evidence can become disclosed as deception and, in that event, presupposes a similar evidence by which it is "shattered".

Vgl. PP lxxx

More generally, we must not wonder if our evident truths [nos évidences] are really truths, or if, by some defect of our mind, what is evident for us would actually be revealed as illusory when measured against some truth in itself. For if we speak of illusion, this is because we have previously recognized illusions, and we could only do so in the name of some perception that, at that very moment, vouched for itself as true, such that doubt, or the fear of being mistaken, simultaneously affirms our power of unmasking error and could thus not uproot us from the truth. We are in the truth, and evidentness is “the experience of truth.” To seek the essence of perception is not to declare that perception is presumed to be true, but rather that perception is defined as our access to the truth.

Siehe auch Erfahrung und Urteil.

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