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# Introduction

* *::Aim:: of the book:*

From the traditional perspective, *when* someone has a *true belief*, whether that belief is *genuine knowledge is independent of the costs of being wrong*. My aim is to provide *a systematic case against this thesis*.

i.e. what makes belief into knowledge is not entirely a matter of factors concerning truth-conduciveness.

* *Intellectualism*: "knowledge does not depend upon practical facts" (6)

- *pragmatic encroachment*: knowledge does depend on practical facts?

## Test Cases

1. Low Stake

* Hannah/Sarah {High attributor & High subject}

* don’t care [if the bank is open]

* *IRI*

* HS: "HS know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist:*

* HS: "HS know [that the bank is open]"

2. High Stake

* H/S {High attributor & High subject}

* do care [if the bank is open]

* *IRI*

* HS : "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* HS: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

3. Low Attributor - High Subject Stakes

* H/S {High subject}

* do care

* Jill {Low attributor}

* don’t care [if the bank is open]

* *IRI*

* J: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* J: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

4. *Ignorant High Stakes* *{Low attributor, High subject}*

* H/S

* should care. don’t know should.

* *IRI*

* HS: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* HS: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

5. High Attributor - Low Subject Stakes

* Bill {Low subject}

* don’t care [if the bank is open]

* H/S [High attributor]

* do care [if the bank is open]

* *IRI*

* HS:"B does not know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* HS:"B does not know [that the bank is open]"

# Chapter 1, Contextualism

* *Relevant alternative theory*: knowing a true proposition one believes at a time requires being able to rule out relevant alternatives to that proposition at that time.

* *Single-premise epistemic closure*:

1. someone knows the conjecture p

2. someone knows p entails q

---

3. that person knows that q

* *RAT rejects the following argument because they reject single-premise epistemic closure*

1. I know that I have hands.

2. I know that having hands entails I am not a brain in a vat.

---

3. I know that I am not a brain in a vat.

* In contrast to these elegant accounts of Low Stakes, High Stakes, and High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes, *the contextualist does not* have any clear account of our intuitions in *Low Attributor-High Subject Stakes*

# Chapter 4, Contextualism on the Cheap?

* paucity of linguistic evidence

* good intuitions for cases discussed in the introduction

* need non-contextualist explanations for evidence introduced in the intro.

# Chapter 5, Interest Relative Invariantism (85-104)

* ::Chapter summary::: "developed one version of IRI, used it to explain the various intuitions discussed in the Introduction, and discussed some worries with it." (104)

* IRI

"Same proposition every context; hence, not context-sensitive."

Univocal knowledge relation, sensitive to the subject’s practical situation at the putative time of knowing.

"knowledge is sensitive to an additional traditionally non-epistemic factor"

* Contextualism can be readily applicable to paradoxes involving

* "know that p" (skeptical paradoxes)

* "true" (liar paradox)

* vague terms (sorites paradox)

* IRI + the probability account of knowledge (91-92)

[image:8526279C-5338-446E-90E4-BF08633F25B1-94055-000287E4708C114B/77762092-6F6E-4AAB-AC4F-002EE33F75E2.png]

* notion of serious practical question

* serious practical question for the subject

* evidence reduce the probability of the negation of this proposition to a sufficiently low level

* sufficiently low = costs of being wrong

* BUT, *WHAT IT IS* FOR A PROPOSITION *TO BE A SERIOUS PRACTICAL QUESTION* FOR A SUBJECT AT A TIME?

ignore some possibility because [astroid example]

* low probability

* nothing i can do about it

* no substantial change of plan

*Practically relevance:*

* Christian List: "a proposition /p/ is *practically relevant* if and only if its truth or falsity would *affect the preference ordering of the actions at my disposal*."

* Jason Stanley: "*warranted expected utilities* of the action at an *agent’s disposal*." [not subjective credence] (95)

*Practical + Epistemic*

* e.g. proposition expressed by "you have an even number of hairs"

[image:0D1C3F61-F75D-492C-BFE4-E634242324F7-94055-00029B82F701E65F/5F226FCF-CC78-4D8F-8669-BA1465911996.png]

> WTF???

```

Low Attributor - High Subject Stakes

* H/S {High subject}

* do care

* Jill {Low attributor}

* don’t care [if the bank is open]

* *IRI*

* J: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* J: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

*Ignorant High Stakes* *{Low attributor, High subject}*

* H/S

* should care. don’t know should.

* *IRI*

* HS: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

* *Contextualist*

* HS: "HS don’t know [that the bank is open]"

```

* bank is open is a serious practical question for hannah

* ought to be aware of her impending bill, the fact there is the impending bill is relevant for the warranted expected utility calculation. (97)

# Chapter 6, Interest Relative Invariantism vs Contextualism (105-130)

* ::Chapter Summary::

* putative costs for IRI

* odd consequences for *modal and temporal embeddings*

* augmented with alternative account of certain cases of the *High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes*

* Contextualism

* not clearly fare better with *modal and temporal embeddings*

* contextualism fares considerably worse on its *explanation of the intuitions* we start with

* There are *costs to contextualism* that is not shared by the IRI

* IRI/Contextualism treatments of epistemological *skepticisms*

---

* Modal and Temporal Embeddings

* IRI: it countenances the truth of the following counterfactual

* "If H had a bill coming due, then she wouldn’t know that the bank would be open on Saturday" is true (106)

* IRI: "H didn’t know on Thursday that the bank would be open on Saturday, but she did know on Friday." is true

* even though same evidence on Fri and Thursday (106)

* Contextualism: prima facie consistent with intellectualism

* %%%%

* David Lewis - context-dependence is due to a tight analogy between knowledge attributions and quantifier phrases.

* what does it mean for a possibility to be be properly ignored (110 - 111)

* other theories, like reliabilism, has problems with modal imbeddings, too. (114)

---

* High Attributor - Low Subject Stakes

* "In every kind of case that poses a prima facie problem for IRI, there is a translation scheme to a precisely parallel case that poses the same sort of problem for contextualism."

* *"people ignore some of the metaphysical determinants of knowledge, rather than being ignorant of features of their language." (116)*

* High Attributor - Low Subject Stakes (114-115)

* IRI: deny intuitions.

* Contextualist - accept intuitions.

* bookkeeping vs connection between knowledge and action

* "From the perspective that results from adopting the principle that *one should act only on what one knows*, the intuitions we have in High Attributor-Low Subject takes look to be clearly mistaken" (115)

* High Attributor - Low Subject Stakes (adapted)* (115-116)

* IRI: deny intuitions for reasons discussed in (114-115).

* Contextualist - deny intuitions.

* semantic blindness.

* we are blind to the semantic workings of our knowledge.

* we make errors about the truth value of knowledge ascriptions as a result of such blindness.

* Contextualism: Ignorant High Stake

* captures it by abandoning the intention-based thesis about context-sensitiv expressions

* IRI has similar strategies. (118-)

---

Semantic commitments of IRI and contextualism

IRI:

* metaphysical thesis about the nature of the language relations. no semantic burden. (120)

* metaphysical claim that there are non-truth-conductive factors at play in determining whether someone knows a true proposition he or she believes. (121)

* *IRI is not a special semantic thesis that is an application of a general strategy for avoiding apparent conflict, there is no additional burden on its advocates.* (123)

* IRI entail the falsity of a prima facie plausible epistemic thesis - intellectualism (not affected by practical fact).

* but IRI about knowledge is not about evidence or other epistemic notions. IRI about knowledge is only that the thesis that intellectualism is false about knowledge. (124)

* form the perspective of intellectual, IRI is more radical than contextualism. considerably more extreme epistemological claim than the contextualist makes. (124-125)

Contextualism:

* knowledge attributions are context-sensitive in a distinctly epistemological way leaves her with a semantic burden. (120)

* an instance of general method of resolving any conflicting claims. it’s always open to someone to resolve the apparent conflict by maintaining that the two occurrences of S in the claims express different propositions, relative to their differing contexts of use. there are contextualist accounts of every extant philosophical problem. (122)

* IRI is not an instance of a strategy generally available for having all apparent conflicts (123) IRI is available in knowledge because of special features of the case.

* preservation of intellectualism about knowledge.

* diagnosis of the skeptical problematic. (IRI has an alternative to the contextualist’s diagnosis) (125)

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