I believe that most of the major early and mid-seventeen-century Confucians, and indeed many of those who came later, can be understood through this prism of tension between the imperatives of Neo-Confucianism and those of the hereditary feudal order (Paramore 2012b). In the case of someone like Kumazawa, the tension between the way the state operated and his Neo-Confucian ideals are obvious. Yamaga Soko's entire ideological system was set up almost to prove the necessity of Neo-Confucian forms of practice in a warrior society. But even elements of seventeen-century Japanese Confucianism which most served state ideological purposes can be viewed as attempts to resolve the tension between Confucianism and the nature of feudal warrior Japan. For instance, Yamazaki Ansai made a point of rejecting the Confucian doctrin which allowed for (indeed, justified) the replacement of an unvirtuous ruler. Neo-Confucian readings of the doctrine of Heaven's Mandate linded the ruler's morality to the legitimacy of their dynastic rule. Yamazaki's rejection to this element of Neo-Confucian discourse, while simultaneously claiming to be a defender of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, can be view as an attempt to adapt Neo-Confucianism to the political situation in Japan - to mitigate against the inherent tensions between this moralistic and potentially meritocratic ideology and the reality of the Tokugawa state. Even the most pro-state thinkers like Yamazaki and Hayashi therefore seem to have had at the base of their ideas an understanding of the inherent tension between Neo-Confucianism and the feudal state.