哲学史讲演录(第四卷) 9.3分
读书笔记 第260页
江绪林

“人在自己的精神中拥有的自由是至高无上的绝对的东西,自由意志是人的概念。自由恰恰就是思维本身;要是抛开思维来谈自由,就不知道自己说的是什么东西。思维的自身统一性就是自由,就是自由意志。作为意欲的思维,就是抛弃自己的主观性的欲望,与存在的联系,自我实现,因为我是愿意把作为存在者的我与作为思维者的我等同起来。意志只有作为思维的意志才是自由的(man has liberty in his spirit as the altogether absolute, that free-will is the Notion of man. Freedom is just thought itself; he who casts thought aside and speaks of freedom knows not what he is talking of. The unity of thought with itself is freedom, the free will. Thought, as volition merely, is the impulse to abrogate one's subjectivity, the relation to present existence, the realising of oneself, since in that I am endeavouring to place myself as existent on an equality with myself as thinking. It is only as having the power of thinking that the will is free. )。”——黑哥《哲学史讲演录》4:260。 这种对自由的理解比密尔深邃多了,只是基本被抛弃了。

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《哲学史讲演录(第四卷)》的全部笔记 22篇
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