西方大观念(全二卷) 9.3分
读书笔记 101 智慧 Wisdom
** 总论 *** 在心智的诸种才能中,智慧的特殊性质体现在 每个人都会同意的那些能够被认作智慧的东西之中一一 那些不能够被泛泛地称之为技艺以及科学或者知识和学问的东西。 许多世纪以来,我们相信, 知识可以稳固地增长,学问可以不断进展, 但是我们并不认为在智慧之中也能有这样的进展。 个体可以在智慧上取得增长。 但是人类在智慧上似乎并没有这样的增长。 THE special character of wisdom among the attainments of the mind shows itself in the things which everyone will agree can be said about wisdom- things which cannot be said about art and science, or knowledge and learning generally. We believe that, with the centuries, knowledge can be steadily increased and learning advanced, but we do not suppose that the same progress can be achieved in wisdom. The individual may grow in wisdom. The race does not seem to. 在伟大著作的传统中,现代人通常断言他们在所有技艺和科学上都超越了古代人。 但是他们极少宣称在智慧方面也超越了古代人。 "现代科学"这一术语无须任何说明, 但是如果有人想要谈论"现代智慧",他就要不得不解释他的意思。 当"现代"一词修饰"科学"一词时,它似乎具有一种可以直接被人们接受的意义, "古代"这个词修饰"智慧"时似乎也有一种可以直接被人们接受的意义。 它暗示了,似乎许多世纪以来智慧并没有获得增长,相反倒是被失却了。 In the tradition of the great books, the moderns usually assert their superiority over the ancients in all the arts and sciences. They seldom claim superiority in wisdom. The phrase "modern science" needs no elucidation, but if anyone were to speak of modern wisdom, he would have to explain his meaning. As "modern" seems to have an immediately acceptable significance when it qualifies "science," so "ancient" seems to go with "wisdom," and to suggest that, with the centuries, far from increasing, wisdom may be lost. 和现代的著作比起来,智慧在古代和中世纪的著作中被更加频繁、更加广泛地讨论。 古代人似乎不仅仅更加渴望智慧,而且也更想知道什么是智慧以及如何获得智慧。 此外,传统对于智慧的讨论既在《新约》和《旧约》中有其奠基, 也在古代异教徒的著作中有其奠基。 Wisdom is more frequently and extensively the subject of discussion in the ancient and medieval than in the modern books. The ancients seem to have not only a greater yearning for wisdom, but also a greater interest in understanding what wisdom is and how it can be gained. The traditional discussion of wisdom, furthermore, has its foundations in the literature of the Old and the New Testament, as well as in the books of pagan antiquity. 智慧并非是知识的另一种形式。 启示宗教的教导开启了一条通往"智慧之心"的道路。 他们并不赞同科学研究的方法。 《圣经》里边屡次宣告,"对主的畏惧是智慧的开端"一一 一种伴随着虔诚和敬拜而增长的智慧,就如同科学随着实验和证据而增长。 This is not true of other forms of knowledge. The teachings of revealed religion open a path to the "heart of wisdom." They'do not propose methods of scientific research. Again and again the Scriptures proclaim that "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"- a wisdom which develops with piety and worship, as science develops with experiment and proof. 智慧还有一个独特的标志,它不会被错误地运用。 我们承认,坏人和好人或许都具有别的种类的知识。 我们也已经看到艺术技能和科学真理遭到邪恶的运用。 但是通常只有一个人智慧地行事之时,我们才认为他是有智慧的。 讽刺作家对愚蠢的赞扬乃是对无用的智慧的谴责。 神学家对"世俗智慧"的谴责则将之作为最愚蠢的东西一一假冒的智慧一一摒弃了。 Still another distinctive mark of wisdom is that it cannot be misused. We recognize that bad men as well as good may possess other kinds of knowledge. We have seen artistic skill and scientific truth put to evil use. But we do not ordinarily think a man wise unless he acts wisely. To act wisely is to act well, even as to have wisdom is to use it. The satirist's praise of folly condemns a useless wisdom. The theologian's condemnation of "worldly wisdom" dismisses it as the worst of folly- a counterfeit of wisdom. 学问的其他形式或许可以其知识和行为是分离的: 而智慧则趋向于将它们统一起来。 研究的其他形式或许包含了对各种事实的认识、理解; 对智慧的追求则致力于关于善恶的知识。 例如柏拉图就将善的妙境作为上升到智慧的辩证法的目标, 不过辩证法不会停留在善的妙境那里,它会返回来照亮行动的领域。 只要我们避免称呼某人是一个智慧的人一一 如果他仅仅只是很博学,是一个学者、科学家或哲学家一一 我们就已经暗示了智慧的上述概念。 Other forms of learning may separate knowledge from action; wisdom tends to unite them. Other forms of inquiry may be content with knowing and understanding the facts; the pursuit of wisdom aspires to a knowledge of good and evil. Plato, for example, makes the vision of the good the goal of a dialectic which ascends to wisdom, yet which does not rest there, but returns enlightened to the realm of action. This conception of wisdom is hinted at whenever we refrain from calling a man wise simply because he is learned- a scholar, scientist, or philosopher. 还是柏拉图,他把智慧摆得很高, 他甚至不称哲学家是智慧的,而只是智慧的一个热爱者。 "没有任何神是哲学家或者智慧的追求者," 苏格拉底在《会饮篇》中说, "也没有任何智慧的人会追求智慧。无知的人也不会追求智慧。" 智慧的热爱者既不是智慧的也不是无知的和的。 正如苏格拉底指出的,他们是"部分地介于智慧与无知之间"。 Again it is Plato who respects wisdom so highly that he will not call the philosopher wise, but only a lover of wisdom. "No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already," Socrates says in the Symposium; "nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom." The lovers of wisdom are neither the wise nor the ignorant and foolish. As Socrates points out, they are "in a mean between the wise and the ignorant." 亚里士多德似乎不同意柏拉图的这一看法, 不过倒不是因为他将智慧看得比柏拉图那里要低, 而是因为他将智慧定义为哲学知识, 尤其是被称之为"神学""第一哲学",或者"形而上学"的思辨科学的最高分支。 他使用"哲学智慧"这一术语以将思辨智慧和实践智慧或政治智慧区别开来, 这暗示了哲学家可以获得他所追求的智慧。 不过亚里士多德也像柏拉图那样说到"哲学家或者智慧的热爱者"; 而柏拉图也像亚里士多德那样把智慧作为基本的人类德性。 Aristotle would seem to disagree, not from a lower regard for wisdom, but because he identifies wisdom with philosophical knowledge, and especially with that highest branch of speculative science which is called "theology," "first philosophy," or "metaphysics." His use of the phrase "philosophical wisdom" to distinguish speculative from practical or political wisdom suggests that the philosopher may attain the wisdom he pursues. Yet Aristotle, like Plato; speaks of "philosophers or lovers of wisdom"; and Plato, like Aristotle, treats wisdom as one of the basic human virtues. *** 我们应该回到亚里士多德和阿奎那在实践智慧和思辨智慧之间作出的区分, 他们常常直接称后者为"智慧",以与"审慎"对照起来。 其他认为只有一种智慧的著述家们有时候强调它的思辨方面,有时强调它的实践方面。 但是对于他们所有人来说,这一双重方面依然是智慧的特殊性质的一部分。 例如,卢克莱修就发现, WE SHALL RETURN TO THE distinction which both Aristotle and Aquinas make between practical and speculative wisdom; they often call the latter simply "wisdom," in contrast to "prudence," which is their name for practical wisdom. Other writers, who treat wisdom as one, sometimes emphasize its speculative, and sometimes its practical, aspect. But for all of them, this double aspect remains part of wisdom's special character. Lucretius, for example, believes, 没有什么比居于宁静的高处,通过智者的教导牢牢地立于高处更令人喜悦的了。 你能够俯视其他人,看到他们到处流浪,寻找着生活的道路却走入迷途。 Nothing is more sweet than full possession Of those calm heights, well built, well fortified By wise men's teaching, to look down from here At others wandering below, men lost, Confused, in hectic search for the right road. 生活的道路,摆脱痛苦、恐惧的危害和徒劳的抗争,这些只有智者才能知道。 这里暗示了宁静是智者的特性。 这似乎也是约翰逊博士对于 "达到了哲学智慧之层次即没有任何欲求的层次的人"的赞许所暗示的。 当博斯韦尔评论说,那么"野蛮人是一个智慧的人"时, 约翰逊反驳道,"先生,我的意思并非简单的没有欲求一一而是摆脱了所有欲求"。 The way of life, free from pain, the distress of fear, and futile struggle, is known only to the wise. Calm and repose are here suggested as attributes of the wise man. That also seems to be the implication of Dr. Johnson's "approbation of one who had attained to the state of the philosophical wise man, that is, to have no want of anything." When Boswell observes that then "the savage is a wise man," Johnson retorts: "Sir, I do not mean simply being without-but not having a want." 对普罗提诺来说,智慧似乎是纯粹思辨的, 它是使理智心灵宁静下来的条件。 他写道:"智慧是宁静的存在状态的条件。 想想当一个人完成了理智的历程时发生了什么; 一旦我们发现了正确的进程,我们也就停止了思索。 我们停下来是因为我们已经达到了智慧。" 然而,对普罗提诺来说,智慧还具有道德的或审美的方面。 他说,"一种灵魂是智慧的、可爱的,另一种则是愚蠢的、丑陋的。 灵魂之美是由智慧构成的"。 For Plotinus, wisdom seems to be purely speculative, and its repose a condition of the reasoning mind at rest. "Wisdom," he writes, "is a condition in a being that possesses repose. Think what happens when one has accomplished the reasoning process; as soon as we have discovered the right course, we cease to reason. We rest because we have come to wisdom." Still wisdom has a moral or, for Plotinus, an aesthetic aspect. "One Soul," he says, is "wise and lovely, another foolish and ugly. Soul-beauty is constituted by wisdom." 智慧的实践或道德方面在弥尔顿、拉伯雷、托尔斯泰等人那里则占据主导地位。 在《失乐园》中,亚当与拉斐尔交流他对人类知识的反思。 The practical or moral aspect of wisdom predominates' in Milton, Rabelais, and Tolstoy. In Paradise Lost, Adam communicates his reflections on human knowledge to Raphael. 但是心灵或者幻想很容易就不受阻碍地 到处冲撞,无休无止: 直到受到警告,被经验教训,她才明白 不应该试图认识那些远离我们的事物 它们是如此晦涩,如此微妙 应该去认识日常生活中我们面前的事物, 这才是首要的智慧;舍此,只会自寻烦恼, 只会陷入空洞、盲目鲁莽, 只会陷入那些我们从未接触、毫无准备的 事物 我们只会不断搜寻,无休无止 But apte the Mind or Fancie is to roave Uncheckt, and of her roaving is no end; Till warn'd, or by experience taught, she learn That not to know at large of things remote From use, obscure and suttle, but to know That which before us lies in daily life, Is the prime Wisdom; what is more, is fume, Or emptiness, or fond impertinence, And renders us in things that most concerne . Unpractis'd, unprepar'd, and still to seek. 卡冈都亚写给他在巴黎学习的儿子庞大罔埃一封信, 他引用所罗门的话"智慧不会进入恶毒的心灵,缺乏良心的知识只是灵魂的毁灭"来告诫儿子。 在《战争与和平》中,当皮埃尔重申了"我们唯一能够知道的是我们一无所知。这是人类最高的智慧"之后, 他从一个共济会成员那里学到,"最高的智慧并非单独地建立在理性之上, 也不是建立在那些世俗的物理、化学之类的科学(理智知识就被分为这些学科〉之上"。 那个共济会成员接着说,最高的智慧 "只是一种科学-一一整体的科学一一它解释全部被造物以及人在其中的地位。 要接受这种科学,必须纯化和更新我们的内在自我…… 而要达到这个目的,我们拥有被称作良心的光辉, 它是上帝注入我们的灵魂的"。 Gargantua, writing a letter to his son Pantagruel while the latter is a student in Paris, admonishes him in the words of Solomon that "Wisdom entereth not into a malicious mind, and that knowledge without conscience is but the ruin of the soul." In War and Peace, Pierre, after reiterating that " All we can know is that we know nothing. And that's the height of human wisdom," learns from the Mason that "the highest wisdom is not founded on reason alone, nor on those worldly sciences of physics, chemistry, and the like, into which intellectual knowledge is divided." The, highest wisdom, the Mason continues, is "but one science-the science of the whole-the science explaining the whole creation and man's place in it. To receive that science it is necessary to purify and renew one's inner self ... And to attain this end, we have the light called conscience that God has implanted in our souls." 虽然柏拉图将智慧定义为理性的德性一一在他看来这是灵魂的知识能力部分一一 但是他不仅赋予智慧沉思真理的功能,也赋予它指引行动的功能。 在《理想国》中苏格拉底宣称,"我们因一个人之中的这个起领导作用的小部分", 这个"知道什么是灵魂三个部分各自的利益,也知道灵魂整体的利益"的部分, 而称这个人是智慧的。 和在灵魂中一样,在国家之中,《法律篇》里来自雅典的异乡客问: "在没有和谐的地方怎么可能有一丁点儿智慧的影子呢?" Though Plato defines wisdom as the virtue of reason- that part of the soul which is for him the faculty of knowledge- he gives it the function of directing conduct as well as contemplating truth. "Him we call wise," Socrates declares in The Republic, "who has in him that little part which rules" and which has "a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole." In the state as in the soul, "how can there be the least shadow of wisdom," the Athenian Stranger asks in the Laws, "where there is no harmony?" "虽然正当的理智居于灵魂之中,但它不是为善而是为恶", 因为理性不能统治灵魂或被灵魂的其他部分遵从了,这个时候,不存在任何的和谐或者智慧。 来自雅典的异乡客继续说道:"当灵魂与知识、意见或者理性对立时一一它们乃是它自然的主人一一我称之为愚蠢, 正如在国家之中当大众拒绝遵从他们的规则或者法律时,这也是愚蠢的。" There is no harmony or wisdom "when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul, and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good" because reason fails to rule or be obeyed. "When the soul is opposed to knowledge,or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords," the Athenian Stranger goes on, "that I call folly, just as it is in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers or the laws." 柏拉图在《理想国》和《法律篇》中都列举了的四种德性是智慧、节制、勇敢和正义。 在《理想国》中正义被赋予某种优先性,它包含了其他三者。 但是在《法律篇》中,主导性的德性是智慧。 来自雅典的异乡客称这些德性为"神圣的善",以区别于诸如健康、美、有力、财富等等东西, 他把智慧看作"主要的善,是神圣的诸善的领导者……其次,是节制; 再次,这两者结合勇敢就产生正义,第四乃是勇敢"。 作为其他善的首领,智慧和它们一样投身于行动的生活。 它并非仅仅运行于思想的领域。 The four virtues which Plato enumerates in both The Republic and the Laws are wisdom,temperance, courage, justice. Justice is given a certain preeminence in The Republic as somehow embracing the other three, but in the Laws, the ruling virtue is wisdom. Calling the virtues "divine goods" to distinguish them from such things as health, beauty, strength,and wealth, the Athenian Stranger makes wisdom "chief and leader of the divine class of goods ... Next," he says, "follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage." As the principle of these other virtues, wisdom like them engages in the life of action. It does not move solely in the realm of thought. *** 当亚里士多德将智慧看作四种德性之中的一种时,他使用了"智慧"这个词, 好像它命名了一种单独的德性。 在《政治学》的一个地方,他说, "一个城邦的勇敢、正义以及智慧和个人具有的使之被称为正义的、智慧的以及节制的那些品质具有同样的形式和本质", 他并没有将智慧区分为思辨智慧和实践智慧。 但是他很少忽略这一区分。 例如,我们刚刚引述的这段文字乃是从下面的陈述开始的, "每个人拥有多少德性和智慧以及多少有德性的和有智慧的行为,他就拥有多少幸福"。 WHEN HE REFERS TO WISDOM as one of the five intellectual virtues, Aristotle uses the word "wisdom" as if it named a single virtue. In the passage in the Politics in which he says that "the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise or temperate," he does not divide wisdom into the speculative and the practical. But he seldom overlooks that separation. The passage just cited, for instance, begins with the statement that "each one has just so much happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action." 这里涉及的德性和智慧将智慧置于德性之外,后者被思考为仅仅只是指道德德性。 在亚里士多德看来,智慧只是在理智优异的序列中是一种德性, 而不是在道德优异或道德特性的序列中。 作为一种理智德性,智慧甚至没有被包括在道德德性的培养或实践中。 在亚里士多德之后,阿奎那也认为,我们完全可以没有智慧而具有首要的德性, 如同没有技术或科学也可以具有德性。 不过阿奎那和亚里士多德都认为, 只有我们在心中牢记哲学智慧和实践智慧或者智慧与审惧的区分,上述说法才是真实的、可理解的。 Here the reference to virtue and wisdom places wisdom outside the virtues, when the latter are conceived exclusively as moral virtues. Wisdom for Aristotle is a virtue only in the order of intellectual excellence, not of moral excellence or character. As an intellectual virtue, wisdom is not even involved in the growth or exercise of the moral virtues. It is as possible, Aquinas says, following Aristotle, to have the cardinal moral virtues without wisdom, as it is to have them without art or science. But for both Aquinas and Aristotle this is neither true nor intelligible unless we bear in mind the distinction between philosophical and practical wisdom, or between wisdom and prudence. 虽然审慎比不上智慧,它也是一种理智的德性一 一种心灵的性质,而不仅仅是我们性格的性质一一它属于道德的德性。 如同美德与邪恶章所指出的,在阿奎那看来,首要的德性包括了审慎,而不是智慧。 类似地,就像我们在审慎章看到的,亚里士多德的理论坚持认为"没有实践智慧"是不可能成为善的, 就如同"没有道德德性是不可能成为实践上智慧的"。 Though prudence is, no less than wisdom, an intellectual virtue- a quality of mind rather than of character- it belongs with the moral virtues. As the chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE indicates, the cardinal virtues according to Aquinas include prudence, not wisdom. Similarly, as may be seen in the chapter on PRUDENCE, Aristotle's theory holds it impossible to be good "without practical wisdom," just as it is impossible to be "practically wise without moral virtue." 亚里士多德写道,实践智慧"相关于人类的事情以及我们可以考虑的事情"。 而另一方面,哲学智慧"从不考虑导致人幸福的事情"。 为了解释这一区别,亚里士多德使用了早期希腊贤人的例子。 "我们说,阿那克萨戈拉、泰勒斯以及和他们类似的人, 当我们看到他们一点也不知道什么东西对他们有利时, 我们说他们具有哲学智慧,但是不具有实践智慧, ……他们知道那些非凡的、令人敬佩的、困难的、神圣的然而无用的事物; 因为他们所探寻的这些事物不是人类的善。" Practical wisdom, Aristotle writes, "is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate." Philosophical wisdom, on the other hand, "will contemplate none of the things that make a man happy. " To explain the difference, Aristotle uses the example of the early Greek sages. "We say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage ... They know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz., because it is not human goods they seek." 如果"智慧"意味着知识的最高形式, 那么在亚里士多德看来这个名称被应用到思辨智慧;而不是实践智慧会更加恰当。 在他看来,知识的最高形式相关于最高的对象。 因此,他说,"因为人并不是世界上最好的存在者,所以实践智慧是最好的知识, 这种想法是非常奇怪的……如果上述观点改成人是最好的动物,那也没有什么区别; 因为还是有其他的存在者,它们的本质比人更加神圣", 智慧乃是"关于本质上是最高的存在者的"知识。 If "wisdom" connotes the highest form of knowledge, then the name, according to Aristotle, is more properly applied to speculative than to practical wisdom. The highest form of knowledge, in his view, is concerned with the highest objects. Hence, he says, "it would be strange to think that ... practical wisdom is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world ... But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine in their nature than man," and wisdom is knowledge "of the things that are highest by nature." 当霍布斯在审慎与贤明之间做出区分之时, 他并没有将一种特殊的对象归于智慧。 他写道,"如同积累很多经验就是审慎,积累许多学识就是贤明"。 使一个人智慧的是他所拥有的学识的总和,而不是他所拥有的某种特殊知识的总和。 笛卡尔也说过,"将所有一切纳入其中的科学就等同于人类智慧", 当他这么说的时候,他似乎也持有和霍布斯类似的观点。 但是对于亚里士多德和阿奎那来说,哲学智慧可以与其他诸种思辨德性区别开来, 比如对第一原则的认识以及对由第一原则推出来的那些科学知识的认识。 哲学智慧包括了其他的思辨德性, 但是在它使用原则推论出与最高原因有关的结果这一点上来讲,它又和它们区别。 如果智慧被理解为由于其对象的原因,它处于科学的顶点,使科学达到完成、臻于完善, 那么智慧可以被称作一门科学。 When Hobbes distinguishes between prudence and sapience, he does not assign a special object to wisdom. "As much experience is prudence," he writes, "so is much science sapience." It is the amount of science a man possesses, not his possession of a particular kind of knowledge, which makes him wise. Descartes seems to take a similar view when he says that "the sciences taken all together are identical with human wisdom." But for Aristotle and Aquinas, philosophical wisdom can be differentiated from the other speculative virtues, such as the understanding of first principles or the scientific knowledge of the conclusions which can be demonstrated from them. It involves them, but it is distinct from them insofar as it uses principles to demonstrate conclusions concerning the highest causes. Wisdom can be called a science if it is understood that by reason of its object it stands at the apex of the sciences, crowning and perfecting them. 在其《形而上学》的开头部分,亚里士多德将智慧等同于最高的哲学科学一一研究第一原则和原因的科学。 他称它是一门"神圣的科学"或"神学",因为,正如他所说,"神被认为是万物的原因,是第一原则"。 哲学不是最有用的科学,但是"由于它自身的理由以及为了认识,它是最值得追求的。 ……它为自身而存在……事实上,所有其他的科学都比这门科学更加必需,但是没有什么科学比它更好"。 In the opening pages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies wisdom with the supreme philosophical science- the science which investigates first principles and causes. He calls it a "divine science" or "theology," for, as he says, "God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle." It is not the most useful science, but the most "desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing ... It alone exists for its own sake ... All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better." 阿奈那虽然应用了亚里士多德的智慧概念, 但是他发现在诸科学中代表智慧的不是形而上学或者哲学家们的神学, 而是神圣的教条或者是基于启示的神学。 他写道:"因为作出命令和评判的是智慧的人,又因为所根据的原因越高,就越没有什么问题不能被评判…… 所以,那绝对地思考着整个宇宙的最高原因的存在者,即上帝,就是最可以被称作智慧的。 ……但是神圣教条所论述的上帝是本质上被看作最高的原因的上帝, 因为它对上帝的论述不仅将上帝看作能够通过被造物而被认识, 就如同哲学家们认识上帝那样……神圣教条也认为上帝可以认识自身, 并显现给其他存在者。" 因此阿奎那得出结论说,"神圣教条特别地被称作智慧"。 While adopting Aristotle's conception of wisdom, Aquinas finds it most eminently represented among the sciences, not by metaphysics or the theology of the philosophers, but by sacred doctrine or the theology based on revelation. "Since it is the part of a wise man to order and to judge," he writes, "and since lesser matters can be judged in the light of some higher cause ... therefore, he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise ... But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause, for it treats of Him not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as the philosophers know Him ... but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence," Aquinas concludes, "sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom." ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *** 哲学家的智慧和神学家的智慧的对照 在形而上学和神学这两章中得到了更全面的讨论。 不过我们这里关注的是 在自然智慧和超自然智慧之间 或者说在人的智慧和神的智慧之间 作出的区分所隐含的更进一步的意思。 THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE wisdom of the philosopher and the wisdom of the theologian is more fully discussed in the chapters on METAPHYSiCS and THEOLOGY. But we are concerned here with the further implications of the difference between natural and supernatural wisdom, or the wisdom of man and of God. 希腊人引人注目地提出了如下问题:人能否获得智慧。 在《申辩篇》中,苏格拉底告诉指控他的人, 他“对那些貌似智慧的人的询问”乃是神谕赋予他的使命, 这个神谕说没有人比苏格拉底更加有智慧。 为了理解神谕的意思,他试图在其他人那里寻求智慧, 但是在对他的审判会上苏格拉底说,“我发现那些最有名望的人都是最愚蠢的人”。 这使他洞见到他自己所拥有的是怎样的智慧。 The Greeks insistently raise the question whether man can have wisdom. In the Apology, Socrates tells his accusers that his "cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom" was a duty imposed upon him by the oracle which declared that there was no man wiser than himself. To understand the oracle's meaning, he tried to seek out wisdom in other men but, he says at his trial, "I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish." This gave him an insight into the kind of wisdom which he himself possessed. 苏格拉底宣称:“我的听众们总是想象着我自己拥有别人所追求的智慧, 但是真实的情况是,雅典的人们呀,只有神才是智慧的; 通过那个神谕,神要表明人的智慧是很小的或者根本不值一提; 他不是在说苏格拉底,他只是用我的名字表明上面的意思, 他好像在说,你们人中间最聪明的是像苏格拉底那样知道自己的智慧实际上没有任何价值的人。” 在《斐德罗篇》中,苏格拉底拒绝称任何人是聪明的, "因为那是个只属于神的伟大称号"。 对人而言,"爱智者或哲学家是合适的称呼"。 "My hearers always imagine," Socrates declares, "that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others; but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing." Again in the Phaedrus, Socrates refuses to call any man wise, "for that is a great name which belongs to God alone." For men, "lovers of wisdom or philosophers is the modest and befitting title." 亚里士多德也谈到最配得上智慧这一称呼的科学, 它是关于神圣事物的科学, “这样的科学只能是神单独地拥有,要么就是神超越于其他存在者之上而拥有”。 亚里士多德并不认为神圣的力量是会嫉妒的, 但是如果说诗人们对神的嫉妒的描绘有什么道理的话, “它可能首先在这种情形下才会发生, 在智慧方面胜过神的所有人都会遭受不幸”。 依亚里士多德的观点,对智慧的拥有“或许被确切地视为超出了人的力量”, 在这个意义上,“人类不满足于追求适合于他的知识,这是不适宜的”。 Aristotle also says of the science which most deserves the name of wisdom, because it is a science of divine things, that "such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others." He does not think that the divine power can be jealous, but if there were any truth in what the poets say about the jealousy of the gods, "it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate." To whatever extent the possession of wisdom "might be justly regarded as beyond human power," it would be unfitting, in Aristotle's opinion, "for man not to be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him." 在这方面基督徒的观点比异教徒的观点更加具有代表性。 蒙田写道:“基督徒具有一种特别的知识, 人心中怎样自然地、原初地就具有邪恶的好奇心: 对知识的渴求以及想要变得更加智慧的欲望是人类毁灭的第一步, 这条路将使他陷入永恒的诅咒。” 在《失乐园》中,亚当在离开伊甸园的时候对天使米迦勒说, This is even more typically a Christian than a pagan sentiment. "Christians have a particular knowledge," writes Montaigne, "of the extent to which curiosity is a natural and original evil in man. The urge to increase in wisdom and knowledge was the first downfall of the. human race; it was the way by which man hurled himself into eternal damnation." In Paradise Lost, as he is about to leave the Garden of Eden, Adam says to the angel Michael: 接到离开这里的指令 我思绪宁静,内心充实 我知道我这血肉能够承载什么 超出它我只会陷入愚蠢 对于亚当的这些话,米迦勒回应道: 这很有见地。已经达到了智慧…… Greatly instructed I shall hence depart. Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill Of knowledge, what this vessel can containe; Beyond which was my folly to aspire. To which the angel replies: This having learnt, thou hast attained the summe Of wisdom ... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 但是《圣经》不仅仅嘱咐 人要在人的最出色的智慧和神的无限智慧之间的鸿沟面前保持谦卑。 它不仅在《耶利米书》中说,"不要让智者在其智慧中得到荣耀", 它还说,"愚蠢的人轻视智慧"。 在《雅各书》中,我们发现真正的智慧和愚蠢截然分离。 如果智者的知识没有伴随着"智慧的谦逊", 如果"你们心里怀有的是苦毒的嫉妒和纷争",那么 "这个智慧不是从上头来的,乃是属地的、属情欲的、属魔鬼的…… 但是从上头来智慧,先是清洁,后是和平,温良柔顺,满有怜悯,多结善果,没有偏见,没有假冒"。 But Sacred Scripture does more than enjoin man to humble himself before the chasm between human wisdom at its best and the infinite wisdom of God. It does more than say in the words of Jeremiah: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom," for it also says that "fools despise wisdom." In the Epistle of James we find true wisdom set apart from false. If the knowledge of the wise man is not accompanied by the "meekness of wisdom," if instead there is "bitter envying and strife in your hearts," then "this wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish ... But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy." ……世人凭自己的智慧,既不认识上帝, 上帝就乐意用人所当作愚拙的道理拯救那些信的人;这就是上帝的智慧了。 犹太人是要神迹,希腊人是求智慧, 但是我们却是传钉十字架的基督, 在犹太人为绊脚石,在外邦人为愚拙; 但在那蒙召的,无论是犹太人、希腊人,基督总为上帝的能力,上帝的智慧。 因上帝的愚拙总比人智慧,上帝的软弱总比人强壮。 在这种情况下,圣保罗问道:"上帝岂不是要使愚拙变成这个世界的智慧?" Saint Paul asks: "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? When ... the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; But unto them which are called both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men. 圣保罗继续对哥林多人写道,"我说的话和传的道"。 不是用智慧委婉的言语,乃是用圣灵和大能的明证, 叫你们的信不在乎人的智慧,只在乎上帝的大能。 然而,在完全的人中,我们也讲智慧。 但不是这世上的智慧,也不是这世上有权有位、将要败亡之人的智慧。 我们讲的,乃是从前所隐藏、上帝奥秘的智慧,就是上帝在万世以前预定使我们得荣耀的。 "My speech and my preaching," Saint Paul continues to the Corinthians, ... was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden mystery, which God ordained before the world unto our glory. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 自然智慧这种智慧的开端是惊异,亚里士多德将之看作人类探究的最终目标。 但是《圣经》说的智慧则始于对上帝的畏惧,它不是通过人自身的努力获得的,而只是上帝的恩赐。 雅各宣称,"你们中间若有缺少智慧的,应当求那厚赐予众人也不斥责人的上帝,主就必赐给他"。 在帕斯卡看来,一个人不应该为自己的学识而骄傲, "即使有骄傲也应该是为了智慧,因为人是不能自己让自己变得智慧的……只有上帝才能给予智慧, 这就是为什么凡以自己为荣的,就在上帝中以自己为荣"。 Wonder is the beginning of the kind of natural wisdom which a philosopher like Aristotle regards as the ultimate goal of human inquiry. But the supernatural wisdom of which Scripture speaks begins with the fear of God and comes to man not through his efforts at learning, but only as a divine gift. "If any of you lack wisdom," Saint James declares, "let him ask God, that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him." It is wrong for a man to take pride in his own learning but, according to Pascal, " the proper place for pride is in wisdom, for it cannot be granted to a man that he has made himself wise ... God alone gives wisdom, and that is why Qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur." 神学家们在《诗篇》中详细地描述了"对主的畏惧是智慧的开端"。 奥古斯丁列举了达到智慧的七个阶段,他写道, "我们必须首先应该在对上帝的畏惧的指引下去寻求他的意志的知识, 他命令我们去欲求什么,避免什么。 这种畏惧将必然地存在于我们的道德思考中,存在于对我们面前的死亡的思考中, 这种畏惧将把骄傲的情绪钉死在十字架上,就如同我们的肉体被钉在树上"。 在畏惧之后的是虔诚、知识、坚定、忠告、纯洁心灵, 最后,这个"神圣的人内心如此单纯,如此纯洁, 因此不论是为了愉悦人们还是为了想要避免困扰此生的任何烦恼,他都决不会避开真理的。 这样的人就上升到了智慧,它是第七个阶段也是最后的阶段, 他享受智慧的时候内心会非常宁静"。 The theologians dwell at length on the text of the Psalmist that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Enumerating seven steps to wisdom, Augustine writes: "First of all, it is necessary that we should be led by the fearof God to seek the knowledge of His will, what He commands us to desire and what to avoid. Now this fear will of necessity excite in us the thought of our mortality and of the death that is before us, and crucify all the motions of pride as if our flesh were nailed to the tree." Then in succession come the steps of piety, knowledge, resolution, counsel, purification of heart; and, finally, the "holy man will be so single and so pure in heart that he will not step aside from the truth, either for the sake of pleasing men or with a view to avoid any of the annoyances which beset this life. Such a man ascends to wisdom, which is the seventh and the last step, and which he enjoys in peace and tranquility." 在阿奎那看来,只有始于信仰的智慧才同时也始于畏惧。 "一个东西可以以两种方式被称作智慧的开端,"他解释道, "一种方式是因为它自身作为自身的本质是智慧的开端, 另一种方式是因为它自身作为自身的结果是智慧的开端。 因而,一件被造物作为它的本质的开端是这个被造物所源自的原则, 而它作为自身的结果的开端则是它由之开始运作的地方。" 阿奎那接着指出,神学家们以一种方式思考智慧,哲学家们则以另一种方式思考它。 由于哲学家的智慧不是始于信仰的条款,而是始于理性的公理,因此它也不是始于畏惧而是始于惊异的。 Only the wisdom which begins with faith, according to Aquinas, also begins with fear. "A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways," he explains; "in one way, because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate." Aquinas then points out that wisdom is considered by theologians "in one way, and in another way by philosophers." As the wisdom of the philosophers does not begin with articles of faith but with axioms of reason, so it does not begin with fear but with wonder. 哲学的智慧和宗教的智慧都在于对神圣事物的认识,但是,阿奎那写道, "正如我们看到的,智慧不仅仅在于知晓上帝, 正如同哲学家们做的那样,它还在于指引人类的行为, 因为人类的行为不仅是由人的律法所指引的,它更是由神圣的律法指引的…. 因此就其本质而言的智慧的开端乃在于智慧的首要原则,即信仰的条款, 在此意义上,信仰被说成是智慧的开端。 但是谈到结果,智慧的开端乃是智慧开始起作用的那个点, 以这种方式畏惧成为智慧的开端, 不过畏惧也有两种方式,奴隶般的畏惧和顺从的畏惧"。 The wisdom of the philosophers and the wisdom of the religious both consist in knowledge of divine things, but "wisdom, as we look at it," Aquinas writes, "is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human conduct, since this is directed not only by the human law, but by the divine law ... Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e., the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way and filial fear in another. 阿奎那解释道:"因为一个人会由于对惩罚的畏惧而避免为恶, 因而他就受到了智慧的结果的影响, 在这个意义上,奴隶般的畏惧就像是使他转而有意于智慧的一个原则….. 另一方面谦逊的畏惧或者顺从的畏惧作为开启了智慧的第一个结果,也是智慧的开端。 因为既然神圣律法规范的人类行为属于智慧,那么为了有一个开始, 人必须首先畏惧上帝并使自己顺从他。" "For servile fear," Aquinas explains, "is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom ... On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him." 我们先前提到的智慧的特性一一它既是思辨的知识也是实践的知识, 既与事物的最终本质相关,也与人的最终的善相关一一 似乎就是神学家称作的"智慧的恩赐"的一个醒目的例子。 在柏拉图的设想中,智慧或许具有上述双重特性, 但是在亚里士多德看来,作为与审慎相对立的智慧纯粹是思辨的。 甚至当它处理作为每个事物的善的目的时,当它一般地处理"自然整体的至善"时, 它依然是思辨的。 正如亚里士多德所指出的,它只是在如下的方面思考目的或者善, 它研究"第一原则和原因:因为善,也就是目的乃是原因之一"。 因此它并不指引人追求他自己的目的,也不颁布一种好的生活的规则。 The special character of wisdom which we noted earlier- that it is at once speculative and practical knowledge, that it is concerned both with the ultimate nature of things and the ultimate good for man- seems to be strikingly exemplified in what the theologian calls "the gift of wisdom." Wisdom as Plato conceives it may have this double character, but for Aristotle, as we have seen, wisdom, as opposed to prudence, is purely speculative. It remains speculative even when it deals with the end which is the good of each thing "and in general with the supreme good in the whole of nature." It considers the end or the good, as Aristotle indicates, only under the aspect of investigating "the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e., the end, is one of the causes." It does not thereby direct man to his own end, or lay down the rules of a good life. 阿奎那告诉我们,智慧的超自然恩赐 "不仅仅是思辨的,它也是实践的…属于作为一种恩赐的智慧的,不仅是沉思神圣的事物,而且也规范人的行动"。 具有这样含义的智慧不仅扩展到"神圣事物隐藏的奥秘", 这些奥秘超出了人能够凭他自然的努力能够获得的最大的智慧, 这一智慧也指引人的行动趋向 “作为最终目的的最高的善,知道这个最高的善的人被认为是真正有智慧的”。 The supernatural gift of wisdom, Aquinas tells us, "is not merely speculative but also practical ... It belongs to wisdom as a gift, not only to contemplate divine things, but also to regulate human acts." Such infused wisdom not only extends "to the hidden mysteries of divine things," which are beyond the greatest wisdom man can acquire by his natural efforts, but this wisdom also directs man's actions to "the sovereign good which is the last end, by knowing which man is said to be truly wise." --------------------------------------------- *** 像奥古斯丁、阿奎那这样的基督教神学家们藐视哲学家们的智慧, 因为哲学家们不能洞察神圣的奥秘也不能引导人获得救赎。 奥古斯丁在柏拉图的教导中发现了对基督教的智慧的一个非凡的预示。 当奥占斯丁将"一个模仿上帝、认识上帝、爱上帝的智慧者, 一个通过在上帝的祝福中与上帝为伴而获得了护佑的智慧者"的概念归于柏拉图的时候, 他说,"很明显没有人比柏拉图主义者更接近我们了"。 虽然阿奎那坚持认为,"作为一种恩赐的智慧比作为一种理智德性的智慧更加卓越, 因为它通过使自己的灵魂与上帝的合一而更密切地达到了上帝", 但当他谈到亚里士多德时称亚里士多德为"这个哲学家", 他当然将亚里士多德看作自然智慧的体现。 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS LIKE Augustine and Aquinas do not hold the wisdom of the philosophers in contempt because they fail to penetrate the divine mysteries, or to guide man to his salvation. Augustine finds in Plato's teaching a marvelous foreshadowing of Christian wisdom. "It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists," he says, when he attributes to Plato the conception of "the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His own blessedness." Though Aquinas holds that "wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him," he certainly regards Aristotle as the epitome of natural wisdom when he refers to him as "the philosopher." 圣保罗告诫说,"你们要谨慎,恐怕有人用他的学理和虚空的妄言, 不照着基督,乃照人间的遗传和世上的小学就把你们掳去"。 奥古斯丁和阿奎那对这一告诫的解释似乎并不是后来蒙田所说的意思, 蒙田认为,"智慧的意见乃是人的灾难, 由于这个原因,我们的宗教极力劝告我们要无知"。 但是神学家们的确谴责了那些人们易受其影响的智慧的假冒品。 它们是错误的智慧, 哲学家们的智慧则不是错误的,它只是不完善。 The admonition of Saint Paul, "to beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world," does not seem to be interpreted by Augustine and Aquinas to mean, as Montaigne later suggests, that. "the plague of man is the opinion of knowledge. That is why ignorance is so recommended by our religion." But the theologians do condemn the counterfeits of wisdom to which men are susceptible. These are false wisdoms; the wisdom of the philosophers is not false, but imperfect. 我们发现阿奎那列举了三种错误的世俗智慧。 他写道,"如果一个人把他的目的固定于外在的尘世事物上,他的智慧就被称作尘世的智慧; 如果他把自己的目标固定于肉体的种种好处上,他的智慧就叫作情欲的智慧; 如果目的是某个突出的事物,那么这种智慧叫做邪恶的智慧,因为它模仿了恶魔的傲慢"。 这三种世俗智慧构成了阿奎那认为的愚蠢的罪恶。 阿奎那说,"世俗的智慧欺骗我们,使我们在上帝眼里变得愚蠢……" 他补充道,"虽然没有人期望自己愚蠢,但是他却期望着那些会带来愚蠢的事物, 它们使他的感官从精神性的事物中抽离,使感官沉迷于尘世的事物"。 在《诗篇》看来,这种愚蠢的本质就在于拒绝: "愚蠢的人在心中说,不存在上帝。" We find three types of false worldly wisdom listed by Aquinas. If a man "fixes his end in external earthly things," he writes, "his wisdom is called earthly; if in the goods of the body, it is called sensual wisdom; if in some excellence, it is called devilish wisdom, because it imitates the devil's pride." These worldly wisdoms constitute for him the sin of folly. "It is the wisdom of the world," Aquinas says, "which deceives and makes us foolish in God's sight ... Though no man wishes to be a fool," he adds, "yet he wishes those things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things." The essence of such folly, according to the Psalmist, lies in denial: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God." 但是愚蠢还有另一种意思,这种意思的愚蠢既不是罪恶也不是智慧的对立面。 圣保罗宣称,"你们中间若有人在这世界自以为有智慧,倒不如变作愚拙,好成为有智慧的"。 阿奎那评述了这段经文,他解释说, "正如存在着一种叫做世俗智慧的邪恶智慧….. 也存在着一种与这一邪恶智慧相对立的好的愚蠢, 凭借这种愚蠢人怀疑世俗的事物"。 在阿奎那看来,如果在这样的愚蠢中存在着智慧, 那么在被世俗视为天生的愚人或者无知者那里也存在着智慧。 他写道,如果他们获得荣耀,那么 "受了洗的愚人,比如小孩子,会具有智慧的气质, 它是圣灵的恩赐,只不过他们没有智慧的行为, 因为他们身体的障碍妨碍了他们之中的理性的运用"。 But there is another meaning of folly, in which it is neither a sin nor the opposite of wisdom. "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world," Saint Paul declares, "let him become a fool, that he may be wise." Commenting on this text, Aquinas explains that "just as there is an evil wisdom called worldly wisdom ... so too there is a good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things." If there is wisdom in such folly, so also, according to Aquinas, there can be wisdom in those whom the world regards as natural fools or innocents. If they have grace, he writes, "baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them." 在本套巨著的传统中,那些赞美愚蠢的思想家并没有反对《诗篇》的如下评述, 《诗篇》认为只有"愚蠢的人才蔑视智慧"。 毋宁说他们在愚蠢的表现中发现了智慧,井用愚者的智慧来揭露那些假装智慧的人的愚蠢。 蒙田宣称,"我每天都听到愚人们说的并不愚蠢的东西"。 与他遥相呼应的是《皆大欢喜》中的丑角试金石抱怨说, "聪明人可以做傻事,傻子却不准说聪明话"。 西莉亚回答说, "真的,你说的对,因为,自从傻子的一点点小聪明被禁止发表之后, 聪明人的一点点小小的傻气却大大地显摆起来了"。 后面,在和试金石关于打发时间的谈话之后,杰奎斯发现, "当我听了这个穿彩衣的蠢蛋因而也是有道德的人关于时间的这一段玄理, 我的心头开始像公鸡一样叫起来了,我纳闷蠢蛋居然会有这么深刻的思想"。 Throughout the tradition of the great books those who praise folly do not take exception to the Psalmist's remark that only "fools despise wisdom." Rather they find wisdom in thevappearances of folly, and use the wisdom of fools to expose the folly of those who pretend to be wise. "The wise have more to learn from the fools than the fools from the wise," writes Montaigne, quoting Cato the Elder; and in a similar vein, Touchstone, the clown in As You Like It, complains: "The more pity that fools may not speak wisely what wise men do foolishly." To which Celia replies: "By my troth, thou sayest true; for, since the little wit that fools have was silenced, the little foolery that wise men have makes a great show." And later, after a conversation with Touchstone about the passing of time, Jaques observes: "When I did hear the motley fool thus moral on the time, my lungs began to crow like chanticleer that fools should be so deep contemplative." Erasmus, quoting scripture, Cicero, the Stoics, and others, declares that only God is wise and that all men are fools. He even goes so far as to say that Christ, "though he is the wisdom of the Father, was made something of a fool himself in order to help the folly of mankind, when he assumed the nature of man." 莎士比亚戏剧里的弄臣或者丑角具有某种智慧。 在《第十二夜》里,戏弄薇奥拉的那个小丑否认他是奥莉维亚小姐府上的傻子, 他说自己只是"给她说笑话的人"。 他解释说,麻烦并不在于他没有理由,只不过 "文字变得那么坏,我真不高兴用它们来证明我的理由"。 最后他告诉薇奥拉,“先生,傻气就像太阳一样环绕着地球,到处放射它的光辉。 要是傻子不常到您主人那里去,如同常在我的小姐那儿一样,那么,先生,我可真是抱歉。 我想我也曾经在那边看见过您这聪明人”。 Nevertheless, the jesters and clowns in Shakespeare's comedies have a kind of wisdom. In Twelfth Night, the clown who banters with Viola denies that he is the Lady Olivia's fool, but says he is simply "her corrupter of words." The trouble, he explains, is not that he lacks reason, but that "words are grown so false that I am loath to prove reason with them"; and he ends by telling Viola: "Foolery, sir, does walk about the orb like the sun; it shines everywhere. I would be sorry, sir, but the fool should be as oft with your master as with my mistress. I think I saw your wisdom there." 庞大固埃说服巴汝奇和一个愚人一起商量。 "一个智慧的人可以接受一个愚人的教导,"他说, "你知道通过愚人的建议、忠告和预言, 保护了多少国王、王子、国家和社会福利,赢得了多少战争, 解决了各种各样,成打的令人困惑、错综复杂的难题。" 庞大固埃继续评论说,"被称作世俗的智者"的人或许 "在更高的理智的再次判断中……被看作是一个蠢人", 所以,那个"将那些有利于他的肉体和福祉的关切抛在一边…. 对地上的事物的一切忽略都被庸俗地归入愚蠢"的人或许是一个传奇英雄。 Pantagruel persuades Panurge to take counsel of a fool. "The wise may be instructed by a fool," he says. "You know how by the advice and counsel and prediction of fools, many kings, princes, states, and commonwealths have been preserved, battles gained, and diverse doubts of a most perplexed intricacy resolved." As he who "is called a worldly wise man," Pantagruel goes on to remark, may "in the second judgment of the intelligences which are above ... be esteemed a fool," so he may be thought a sage who lays "quite aside those cares which are conducible to his body or his fortunes ... All which neglects of sublunary things are vulgarly imputed folly." 在《战争与和平》中,皮埃尔对他莫斯科大火之后因祸得福的疯狂岁月的反思大意也是如此。 当他回忆他在疯狂时形成的对于人和环境的观点时,他总是发现它们非常正确。 "我或许显得很奇怪、很疯狂,"他对自己说,"但是我并没有我看起来的那么疯狂。 相反,我那时比其他任何时候都更加有智慧,更加富有洞见, 并理解了生命中所有值得理解的东西,因为……因为我那时很快乐。" To the same general effect are Pierre's reflections in War and Peace on the period of his blissful insanity after the burning of Moscow. When he recalls the views he formed of men and circumstances at the time of his madness, he always finds them correct. "I may have appeared strange and queer then," he says to himself, "but I was not so mad as I seemed. On the contrary, I was wiser and had more insight than at any other time, and understood all that is worth understanding in life, because ... because I was happy." ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** 愚蠢并非总是在悖论中受到赞美, 它也不是仅仅只是受到那些 将之等同于拒斥上帝或者背离上帝的基督神学家的严厉谴责。 在《伊利亚特》中,阿伽门农说, "狂迷( Folly) ,宙斯的长女,用愚蠢蒙蔽了人的眼,使他们毁灭。 她步伐优雅,但不是在坚固的土地上,而是在人们的头顶盘旋, 令他们犯错,使他们落入圈套。那一次宙斯也受过她愚弄"。 阿伽门农在宙斯受蒙蔽的这个故事的结尾讲到, 宙斯满怀盛怒地"抓住狂迷的头发,发下诅咒, 她永远也不许再回到天上、回到奥林匹斯, 因为她是所有人、神的祸害。 他拧着她的胳膊把她抡起来,把她从天上扔下去,掉落到凡人的世界"。 FOLLY IS NOT ALWAYS PRAISED in paradox, nor is it seriously condemned only by the Christian theologian who equates it with denying or turning away from God. "Delusion is the elder daughter of Zeus," says Agamemnon in The Iliad, "the accursed who deludes all; her feet are delicate and they step not on the firm earth, but she walks the air above men's heads and leads them astray ... Yes, for once Zeus even was deluded." Agamemnon concludes the story of Zeus's befuddlement' by relating how in his rage Zeus "caught by the shining hair of her head the goddess Delusion in the anger of his heart, and swore a strong oath, that never after this might Delusion, who deludes all, come back to Olympos and the starry sky. So speaking, he whirled her about in his hand and slung her out of the starry heaven, and presently she came to men's establishments." 在世俗的层面上,愚蠢具有很多形式, 在蒙田看来,其中最令人恼怒的是智力的愚钝、愚蠢的鲁莽以及在争论中喋喋不休。 他观察到,"固执己见和在争论中恼羞成怒是愚蠢的最确切的证据"。 "还有什么像笨蛋那样确信无疑、那样坚决、那样倔傲、那样冥想、那样严肃、那样庄重的吗?" On the earthly plane, folly takes many forms, of which, in Montaigne's judgment, the most exasperating are dullness of wit, the boldness of stupidity, and conteqtiousness in argument. "Obstinacy of opinion and heat in argument are the surest proofs of folly," he observes. "Is there anything so assured, resolute, disdainful, contemplative, serious, and grave as the ass?" 不论愚蠢的形式或表现是什么, 也不论愚蠢如何地暗示了智慧或者与人们以为的相对立, 在西方思想的传统中有一个东西是清楚的。 那些把真正的智慧和伪装的愚蠢区分开来的人, 没有一个把愚蠢置于人类诸般善的序列中最高的价值。 Whatever the forms or aspects of folly, and however the wisdom it implies or opposes be conceived, one thing is clear throughout the tradition of western thought. No one who can separate true wisdom from folly in disguise places anything but the highest value on it in the order of human goods . 在《安提戈涅》中,歌队最后吟唱道,"智慧是幸福的最高部分"; 亚里士多德也教导我们,"哲学智慧的活动被公认为各种活动中最令人愉悦的", "所有归于最幸福的人的其他的属性很明显是与这一活动相关的"; 柏拉图在《第七封信》中宣称,他的哲学王的神话应该得到严肃的对待, 因为"除非那些正确地、真正地遵循哲学的人获得政治权力, 或者具有政治权力的阶层,由于神的眷颐而成为真正的哲学家, 不然人类就不会看到好日子"。一一 以上所有这些都表达了古代异教徒对于人类生活和社会中的智慧的赞颂。 The final utterance of the Chorus in Antigone,that "our happiness depends on wisdom"; the Aristotelian doctrine that "the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities" and "all the other attributes ascri-bed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity"; the statement by Plato in his The Seventh Letter, in which he demands that his myth of the philosopher-king be taken seriously, for "the human race will not see better days until either the stock of those who rightly and genuinely follow philosophy acquire political authority, or else the class who have political control be led by some dispensation of providence to become real philosophers" all these express the tribute which pagan antiquity pays to wisdom in human life and society. 对于基督教徒一一神学家、神秘主义者,或者诗人一一来说, 只有在天国中,与居住于上帝的在场中的圣徒一起, 智慧才像爱一样是最高的统治者。 智慧和爱也并非毫无关联。 正如博爱是意志的完善,智慧也是理智的完善。 在《神曲》中,当阿奎那与但丁在天国相遇时, 他向但丁解释,心灵中智慧的秩序的缺乏是如何同时伴随着爱的秩序的缺乏的。 "这样的人在愚人中地位也很低下,"阿奎那的灵魂说道, "他不加区分地断言或者拒绝,在一种事情上和另一种事情上都差不多。 因为轻率的结论时常倒向错误的方向,自爱也束缚了理智。" To the Christian-theologian, mystic, or poet- it is in heaven with the saints who dwell in God's presence that wisdom, like love, reigns supreme. Nor are these two unconnected. As charity is. the perfection of the will, so wisdom is the perfection of the intellect. In The Divine Comedy, Aquinas explains to Dante when they meet in Paradise how lack of wisdom's order in the mind goes hand in hand with love's disorder. "He is right low down among the fools," the spirit says, "who affirms or denies without distinguishing; because it happens that oftentimes hasty opinion inclines to the wrong side, and then fondness for it binds the intellect." 用地上的口吻而不是天国的口吻,依赖于理性而不是依赖于信仰, 斯宾诺莎表达了另一种相当的洞见, 具有智慧就是去有智慧地爱,因为有智慧地认识就是去爱上帝。 他写道,"因此,使理智或者理性尽可能变得完善,这在此生中是非常有益的, 在这个事情中存在着人的最高幸福。 因为幸福就是心灵的宁静,这宁静源于对上帝的洞见性的知识"。 他补充道,不仅"心灵的最高的可能的宁静"源于这种知识, 而且从这种知识"必然地产生对上帝的理智的爱"。 With the accent on earth rather than on heaven, with reliance upon reason rather than upon faith, Spinoza voices a comparable insight that to have wisdom is to love wisely, for to know wisely is to love God. "It is therefore most profitable to us in this life," he writes, "to make perfect the intellect or reason as far as possible, and in this one thing consists the highest happiness or blessedness of man; for blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God." Not only does "the highest possible peace of mind" arise from this kind of knowledge but, he adds, from it also "necessarily springs the intellectual love of God." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** 分类主题 *** 1. 智慧的本质、起源和种类 1. The nature, origins, and kinds of wisdom 1a.自然智慧的不同概念:人类知识的最高形式 1a. Diverse conceptions of natural wisdom: the supreme form of human knowledge 1b. 思辨智慧和实践智慧的区分,或者哲学智慧和政治智慧之间的区分 1b. The distinction between speculative and practical wisdom, or between philosophical and political wisdom 1c. 神学的和神秘的智慧:超自然的信仰和洞见的智慧;智慧的天赋 1c. Theological and mystical wisdom: the supernatural wisdom of faith and vision; the gift of wisdom 1d. 神的智慧:与神圣智慧相对照的人类智慧的不足;世俗智慧的愚蠢或空虚 1d. The wisdom of God: the defect of human wisdom compared with divine wisdom; the folly or vanity of worldly wisdom *** 2. 智慧、德性和幸福 2. Wisdom, virtue, and happiness 2a. 作为理智德性的智慧:它与其他理智德性尤其是科学和知性之间的关系;愚蠢的不道德或罪 2a. Wisdom as an intellectual virtue: its relation to other intellectual virtues, espe-cially science and understanding; the vice or sin of folly 2b. 智慧和人对善与恶的知识:智慧与道德德性之间的关系 2b. Wisdom and man's knowledge of good and evil: the re'ation of wisdom to the moral virtues 2c. 智慧作为一种善:它在幸福生活中的角色;智慧的人在社会中的地位 2c. Wisdom as a good: its role in the happy life; the place of the wise man in society *** 3. 对智慧的爱和通达智慧的步骤:诡辩者、哲学家和智慧的人 3. The love of wisdom and the steps to wisdom: the sophist, the philosopher, and the wise man *** 4. 对愚蠢的赞颂:愚人和无知者的智慧 4. The praise of folly: the wisdom of fools and innocents [丁三东译] 1116
《西方大观念(全二卷)》的全部笔记 2篇
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